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- to hold regular conferences, workshops, seminars and guest lectures on topics related to European political parties;
- to publish a series of parties-related research papers by scholars from Keele and elsewhere;
- to expand postgraduate training in the study of political parties, principally through Keele's MA in Parties and Elections and the multinational PhD summer school, with which its members are closely involved;
- to constitute a source of expertise on European parties and party politics for media and other interests.

The Unit shares the broader aims of the Keele European Research Centre, of which it is a part. KERC comprises staff and postgraduates at Keele who are actively conducting research into the politics of remaking and integrating Europe.

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Abstract. Within the rapidly growing literature of positioning political parties along policy dimensions, the rich data series collected by the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) have been widely considered as the most systematic and objective source of information. For estimating parties’ positions on the Left-Right dimension alone, there have been proposed several different methods which make use of the CMP data. However, unless a new method is proposed, there is seldom an attempt to check the robustness of the findings across different measurement strategies. In this paper, we focus on the parties in Greece which have been notoriously incorrectly positioned by the ‘standard’ method proposed by CMP. We contrast the ‘standard’ method with various proposed alternatives and show that the latter outperform the first both in terms of face and convergent validity and in terms of reliability. In addition, we show that this cross-checking is essential, since different methods often lead to diametrically different results.

Keywords: ideology, left-right, party manifestos, reliability, validity

Introduction

Positioning political actors (and political parties in particular) along the Left-Right (L-R) continuum and other policy dimensions has been an important feature of recent empirical research in comparative politics. Based on a variety of theories and methods, political scientists are now ‘able to operationalize a wide range of models within what has become an important sub-discipline of political science’ (Laver 2001a: 6). Three main approaches have been proposed for the study of party location: a) expert surveys, b) opinion poll data, and c) content analysis of party manifestos.\(^1\) Even though there is an ongoing discussion about the strengths and weaknesses of each approach (see Budge, 2000; Kleinnijhuis and Pennings, 2001; Mair, 2001; McDonald et al., 2007; Volkens, 2007), the latter has nevertheless become the most popular for two reasons: Firstly, data from party manifestos attain a greater degree of impartiality. Expert surveys and opinion poll data give us the picture of the party as perceived by political analysts and voters respectively.

\(^1\)A fourth approach, the analysis of roll call data, is becoming increasingly popular. The main problem with this approach, however, is that in most legislatures outside the US not all roll call votes are recorded. Because of the different rules and the conditions under which roll call votes are triggered or requested, cross-country analyses are ridden with problems of selection bias (see Carrubba et al., 2006).

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Manifestos, on the other hand, provide more accurate and representative picture of where the parties stand in the policy space, without requiring further knowledge about their policy record. Secondly, the Manifesto Research Group (MRG, now renamed Comparative Manifestos Project, CMP) has produced a rich time series of data (see Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2007) unrivalled by any other method. As a consequence, the MRG/CMP approach has emerged as the *prima facie* method for estimating parties’ policy positions both against alternative data sources and among alternative methods of coding party manifestos.

The result of this general consensus was the proliferation of different analytical methods aiming to measure parties’ ideological positions by using the CMP data (van der Brug, 2001; Budge, 1987; Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006; Gabel and Huber, 2000; Kim and Fording, 1998; Klingemann, 1995; Laver and Budge, 1992). There are two problems with most of these studies, however. First, they often fail to sufficiently address the issue of face validity, whereas they only sporadically examine the reliability of the produced estimates. In effect, the only method that has been subjected to an extensive analytical scrutiny is the ‘standard’ method, originally developed by Laver and Budge (1992, for the performance of this method see Budge and Klingemann, 2001; Klingemann et al., 2007). When the reliability and validity of the estimates are examined, they usually refer only to a particular method, without, thus, rigorously examining how each method performs against the others. The few attempts to compare the methods against each other (see Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006; Gabel and Huber, 2000) are motivated by the need to apply empirical support for a newly proposed measurement strategy.

In an attempt to depart from this pattern, the aim of this paper is to engage in a rigorous examination of the reliability and validity of the various methods of estimating parties’ L-R positions through the CMP data. For illustrative purposes we focus on the case of parties in Greece. First, we show that the variability of the estimates calls for sensitivity testing when inferences are based on findings from one of these methods. Second, we show that, at the case of Greece at least, empirical evidence does not support the tendency to unwarrantedly adopt the ‘standard’ CMP method for measuring party positions, since it seems that existing alternatives seem to outperform it both in terms of validity and in terms of reliability.

**Competing methods for estimating parties’ Left-Right positions**

In this section we briefly present the competing methods for estimating parties’ positions in the L-R dimension. We start with the ‘standard’ method developed by the investigators of CMP (Laver and Budge, 1992). After having reorganized all items in 20 policy dimensions, the authors established two ‘marker’ Left and Right items respectively. Further items that constantly loaded highly with either of these groups and made intuitive sense to be added in either of the two categories were also included. This procedure resulted in a fixed number of items forming the Left and the Right side of the dimension. Party scores were taken by the sum of the references of one group minus the other. We refer to this method as the ‘standard’ method of measuring parties’ positions.

For a more case-specific analysis, an important qualification was proposed by Laver and Budge (1992: 26): seven marker variables (consisting of 28 items) were factor analyzed together with all the remaining items. Two (rotated) factors were extracted, corresponding well to the distinction between Left and Right. Among
all items or marker variables loading highly on either the ‘Left’ or the ‘Right’ factor were included in the respective scales. Again, the final scale was constructed by subtracting the Left scale from the Right scale. We refer to this method as the ‘inductive’ method.

Another method that was proposed (Budge, 1987) was based on the following procedure: all items of each domain were factor analyzed and one or two factors were extracted. All factors were then factor analyzed and the first of the new factors was assumed to be the L-R dimension. This method is called here the ‘two-stage factor analysis (FA)’ method.

Klingemann (1995) proposed a more theoretically based method. Starting from the assertion that the L-R distinction does not refer to parties’ policies about international matters, only items measuring domestic issues were included in the analysis. Two rotated factors were extracted from a factor analysis of all these issues. By observing the pattern matrix, one of the two factors was then deemed to represent parties’ positions in the L-R dimension. We refer to this method as the ‘domestic’ method.

Thus far, all proposed models stem from the principal investigators of CMP. Other scholars, however, proposed some different alternatives. Following Huber and Inglehart (1995), Gabel and Huber (2000) factor analyzed all issues available by the CMP data and then extracted a single common factor, assumingly representing an ideological ‘super-issue’, i.e. a reliable summary of the positions of party in the issue space. Following the suggestion of the authors, we refer to this method as the ‘vanilla’ method.

The last method that is tested here starts with the distinction between valence and position issues (Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006). The relative frequency of references to each item was regressed against party dummies (case-specific approach). Items were divided into position (Left versus Right) and valence ones. Party scores were taken by the ratio of Right minus Left references divided by the total number of references. Frequencies of position issues were adjusted so as to take their valence aspect into account: the score of the minimum party score was subtracted from the original scores (this was implemented only in half cases since in all other instances minimum score was zero). Then, party score for each year was adjusted by taking a weighted mean of the party’s score in the previous and the next election (weights are based on the length of the inter-election period). We refer to this method as the ‘regression’ method. The examination of Greek parties’ positions involves the comparison of the following methods: standard, inductive, two-stage FA, domestic, vanilla, and regression.²

²To the best of our knowledge, this list covers almost all attempts that have been made to construct an encompassing L-R dimension through the CMP data. From this list, three methods have been excluded, namely, Kim and Fording’s (1998) method of ratio differences, van der Brug’s (2001) analysis of party dynamics and Warwick’s (2005) two dimensional method. Regarding the first, it was excluded because it correlates very highly with the original ‘standard’ method (r = .98) and yields almost identical results. Regarding the second, although we agree with van der Brug’s (2001) logic about the problems stemming from analyzing the CMP data with correlation measures, we could not examine his alternative method (which is based on multidimensional scaling) because in this case L-R is not constructed by parties’ positions, but rather extrapolated by voters’ perceptions about the parties as they are provided by election studies. The third was excluded because it does not provide an encompassing L-R measure but two different dimensions (L-R economic and postmaterialism/liberal values) and therefore its estimates cannot be compared to the estimates of the other methods.
Before we move forward in the analysis an important clarifying point needs to be made. As evident, all the attempts to empirically place parties on the L-R dimension with the use of the CMP data follow the same logic: instead of being confined only to economic matters, the L-R scale is constructed in ways in which it encompasses both economic and non-economic issues. Therefore, our understanding of the L-R throughout this paper defines it as an overarching dimension that encompasses both economic (regulatory versus neo-liberal) and non-economic (authoritarian versus libertarian) issues. Reassuringly, empirical evidence from surveys conducted during the period under study shows that the voters in Greece also perceive the L-R both in economic and non-economic terms.\(^3\)

**The reliability of CMP estimates**

Klingemann et al. (2007: 88–97) have recently put the CMP data under rigorous reliability testing with favourable results. The Greek parties, however, were missing from this analysis despite the authors’ claim that they used ‘all established Western democracies in the CMP data-set’ (Klingemann et al., 2007: 90). We therefore start our empirical examination by focusing on the reliability of the ‘standard’ method (Laver and Budge, 1992), which is both the most often used method in general and the only method through which the trajectories of Greek parties’ stances has been rigorously studied (Konstantinidis, 2004). We do that by following two different paths. First, we examine in a more rigorous way the underlying assumptions behind the use of the ‘standard’ L-R scale proposed by Laver and Budge (1992), which is both the most often used method in general and the only method through which the trajectories of Greek parties’ stances has been rigorously studied (Konstantinidis, 2004). We do that by following two different paths. First, we examine in a more rigorous way the underlying assumptions behind the use of the ‘standard’ L-R scale proposed by Laver and Budge (1992). Then, we try a different analytical technique for the comparison of this method with all other alternatives.

As was been described above, the ‘standard’ L-R method is constructed by subtracting a set of items denoting policies preferred by the Left indicators from an equal set of Right indicators (for an exact description see Klingemann et al., 2007). There is a hidden but crucial assumption made here. The addition of a party’s scores in all indicators of the two subsets of items implies that the resulting measure reflects the characteristics of a summated rating scale. Each item is given equal weight and all are assumed to belong in the same latent dimension. Thus, all Left-wing items are assumed to measure an unobserved dimension referring to ‘Left ideology’ and all Right-wing items are deemed to measure ‘Right ideology’. The problem, however, is that a precondition for the incorporation of each item in such a scale is that it is monotonically related to all others (Jacoby, 1992). A rough-and-ready way to examine whether the criterion of monotone homogeneity is satisfied here is to run correlations between each item and a scale constructed by all other items forming the original scale except this. So, to see whether the indicator measuring positive references to military issues (per104) belongs to the Right-wing scale, one would need to correlate this item with a scale containing all other Right items except per104. Yet, since correlations measure linear functions which constitute a stricter assumption than monotone functions, this is a too demanding and thus problematic diagnostic test for the scalability of each item.

\(^3\)This was tested both with the 1981 Euro-Barometer study and the 2002 European Social Survey. In both instances both sets of issues appear to contribute significantly in our understanding about how people locate themselves in the L-R continuum (the results can be found in the online Appendix at http://www.keele.ac.uk/kepru). The consistency between voters’ perceptions about L-R and the logic guiding the construction of L-R scales with CMP data is important for our empirical assessment of the convergent validity, as will come become apparent below.
The approach adopted here is somewhat different and less formal but probably more informative. A locally weighted regression curve (loess) has been fit into a scatterplot between each item and the scale consisting of all other items. As all non-parametric regression methods, the basic idea behind the loess curve is to trace the salient features of the mean response making only minimal assumptions about its distribution (see Fitzmaurice et al., 2004: 69). Thus, a loess curve showing a monotonic pattern can be considered as a good indication that a given item fits to the scale. The results for each item are presented in Figures 1 and 2 for the Right and Left items respectively. Although the analysis is confined to the cases of Greek parties, the non-parametric nature of the loess curve mediates the problem of distribution assumptions difficult to be met with small N (38). Interestingly, in most cases the assumption of a monotonic relationship does not seem to be confirmed, since there is no evidence, whatsoever, that high scores in a given item are associated with high scores in the scale constructed by all other items. This casts doubt on the scalability of the selected items and consequently, on the reliability of the scale. Importantly, a similar pattern is observed for both sets of indicators.

To be sure, Cronbach’s alpha, which is a typical reliability statistic for summed rating scales, is only downward biased if the assumption of monotonicity is not confirmed. Indeed, for the Greek cases the estimates for Left-items is .56 whereas for Right-items .61. The problem however is that Cronbach’s alpha is based on the assumption that all items included in a scale belong to the same underlying dimension. This means that the construction of the two scales is based upon the assumption that fluctuations across the items summed to create each scale are only random. If, however, these observed disturbances reflect systematic deviations stemming from various other underlying dimensions, the scale will appear reliable even when ‘true’ sources of variation stem from several latent dimensions. A way to explore this possibility is by trying to encompass the items in a single dimension through a factor analysis (factors extracted through Iterated Principal factor method). Apart from the standard rule of thumb of eigenvalues greater than one (implying that we choose factors that account for greater part of the variance than each single standardized item), a more helpful rule of thumb is to focus on the angle-point of the screeplot of the eigenvalues associated with each added factor and extract all factors to the left of this point. Both rules of thumb point to a two-factor solution for each group of items.4

The analysis thus far has indicated that the use of the standard method is not confirmed by the performance of this scale in terms of its reliability in the Greek case. The next step is to see whether other methods perform better regarding this criterion. To be sure, since all other methods rest on a procedure that goes beyond the simple logic of summed rating scales, a different strategy needs to be employed for the examination of their reliability. Given that the CMP data in the Greek case capture a period of ten elections, we can make use of this time-dimension in order to estimate the reliability of the different methods. Previous research on assessing single-item reliability with panel data has been guided by the work of Heise (1969) and Wiley and Wiley (1970). The basic idea of this procedure is that party ideology (as any other measured trait) follows a Markovian [AR(1)] process, such that its current value is a function of its previous value plus some random disturbance. Heise’s (1969) model of reliability and stability measurement is based on correlation

4These results can be found in the online Appendix at http://www.keele.ac.uk/kepru
Figure 1. Examining the scalability of the items forming the Right-wing indicators according to the 'standard' CMP method. Note: all items have been recoded, ranging from 0 to 10
Figure 2. Examining the scalability of the items forming the Left-wing indicators according to the ‘standard’ CMP method. Note: all items have been recoded, ranging from 0 to 10.
matrices as opposed to Wiley and Wiley (1970) covariance matrices. The difference between the two models refers to the identifying restrictions that need to be imposed to the data. Whereas the Heise model sets reliabilities constant across the waves, Wiley and Wiley constrain the measurement error variances. Applying the Heise model without making any of these restricting assumptions requires at least four waves in order to estimate the parameters of interest (Green and Palmquist, 1990). In this case, we can obtain the reliability estimates between the two adjacent non-extreme waves, i.e. wave two and wave three. In order to use this method and at the same time retain most of the cases for the analysis, each L-R variable is correlated with its three lags. This means that parties’ positions in the following waves are simultaneously examined:

74–77–81–85
77–81–85–89a
81–85–89a–89b
...
90–93–96–00

Table 1 presents the results for all methods. As it is shown, there is substantial variability in the estimates. Evidently, the original ‘standard’ method performs more poorly than its more elaborate counterparts. Regarding the latter, although the ‘domestic’ method marks out as the most error-laden estimate, there is no procedure that produces estimates as high as those found by Klingemann et al. (2007) in the analysis of established western democracies. Hardly surprisingly, the ‘regression’ method, which already imposes a smoothing restriction to the initial findings, seems to perform better in terms of reliability.

An alternative interpretation of the findings could be that, although its key assumptions are met, the Heise model fails to capture changes in parties’ positions net from measurement error. To address this possibility, we employ an alternative model which has been deemed to capture all necessary sources of change in parties’ ideological stances. The alternation model, as it has been called, assumes that a party’s position is a function of its previous position plus a time trend (see Budge, 1994). Employing this specification for each Greek party, the standard deviation of

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5To be sure, Heise’s model is based upon the assumption of first order autocorrelation. Reassuringly, regressions of each L-R variable against its three lags reveal a descending pattern with the first lag typically significant. More importantly, sources of change in party’s ideological positions do not seem to correlate between different time periods, another crucial assumption of the model. For instance, the residuals of the 1985 scores, as predicted from 1974 scores are not significant predictors of the residuals of the 2000 scores, as predicted by the 1993 scores (the results are available in the online Appendix).
the predicted residuals has across all parties a mean value of 24.4. This value represents the amount of variance in parties’ positions not explained by a specification whose theoretical underpinning is general ideological stability (denoted by the lag) and frequent zigzagging (captured by the trend). In the Klingemann et al. (2007) analysis, where Greece was not included, the two outlier countries were Finland and Iceland. Neither of the two reached this value (20.8 and 18.3 respectively).

**The validity of CMP data and estimates**

*Construct validity*

According to the Carmines and Woods (2005: 936) definition, a measure is said to be construct valid ‘if the empirically observed outcomes are consistent with the theoretical predictions’. In this sense, most attempts to cross-check the validity of CMP data was focussed on whether the data fared well against the ‘prevalence of valence issues’ assumption which the coding of CMP was based on. The first attempt came from Budge and Farlie (1983: 274) who counted each manifesto’s references to other parties and policies. The limited number of such references led them to conclude that there were low levels of confrontation and hence concluded that the CMP’s theoretical assumptions were correct. We, nevertheless, do not believe that measuring references to other parties constitute a valid measure of the degree to which confrontation is marked. Manifestos are by definition texts serving to present a party’s positions to the voters rather than comparing its capabilities or highlighting their differences with other parties. Moreover, Budge and Farlie’s conclusion based merely on data from parties in United Kingdom and United States is unwarranted for other countries. Later on, the investigators of CMP presented a more convincing argument. By measuring the ‘pro versus con’ dyads within the CMP data they found ‘the overwhelming number of references going to the one of the possible positions’ (Robertson, 1987: 50–1), thus confirming that party manifestos are really about ‘valence’ politics, establishing in this way the construct validity of the CMP data. More recently, the ‘salience’ hypothesis was also confirmed by computerized word scores that showed that different issues are selectively emphasized by different parties (Budge, 2001a: 221). Yet we should point out that these construct validity tests refer to the CMP produced data (i.e. levels of salience for each coded issue), not to the ability of these data to estimate parties’ positions on the L-R dimension. The latter require other types of validity tests such as convergent and face validity.

*Convergent validity*

The proliferation of other approaches and methods of positioning political parties (mainly expert surveys and computerized counts) has made it possible to check the convergent validity—i.e. ‘the comparison of a measure against one or more measures that are also measures of the same concept’ (McDonald, 2005: 944)—of CMP policy estimates (but not the data itself). So far, the results have been rather mixed. Estimates for L-R positions do not seem to correlate with estimates from expert surveys (Benoit and Laver, 2007a; Klingemann et al., 2007: 77–9) or computerized word scores (Budge and Pennings, 2007). The latter particularly tend to
‘flatten out’ party movement across time. Budge and Pennings (2007: 123), however, argue that computerized word scores should be dismissed in favour of CMP data because the latter method has produced unsurpassed ‘rich time-series data’. However, we cannot see how a ‘richness of data’ argument can be brought forward in a discussion about validity. ‘Rich data’ by no means implies ‘valid data’, a point taken by Benoit and Laver (2007b), who rightly questioned the notion of CMP being used as a ‘benchmark’ on which all other approaches should be measured against.

**Face validity**

Face validity addresses the question of whether a measure appears to be valid. Although it is often dismissed as a measure of validity in expert surveys (e.g. Ray, 1999: 289-90), because we would not expect from experts to give us estimates that would not make sense anyway, it is a very good measure of checking the validity of data produced by manifesto content analysis. Laver et al. (2003), for example, discuss face validity extensively in assessing the validity of their computerized word scores estimates. Similarly, Laver and Budge (1992: 22) agree that the ‘major check’ to CMP method should be ‘the extent to which it generates results that make sense within countries’. Nevertheless, it is often easily assumed, that the estimates ‘pass the test of face validity’ (Klingemann et al., 2007: 63) without further inquiry. Whenever there is some sort of discussion about face validity, this concerns only the cases of the US and UK which seem to fit the ‘historical experience’ (e.g. Budge, 2001b: 53), and the estimates for the rest of the cases are simply described as ‘quite plausible’ (Budge, 2001a: 216). But exactly how plausible is ‘quite plausible’?

The recent rigorous examination of individual party systems, such as the Italian, reveals that the CMP data ‘do not do a very good job, in terms of face validity, of describing parties’ locations on the left-right dimension’ (Pelizzo, 2003: 67, emphasis added). These problems are evident in other countries ‘as diverse as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands’ (Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006: 164) and most recently, Switzerland (Hug and Schulz, 2007). This criticism can be expanded to include the case of Greece as well, where Budge and Klingemann (2001: 33) awkwardly observed: ‘at first sight Greece is not [convincingly represented by our estimates]. Here the Left is occupied by the Socialists (PASOK). The Communists are in the middle, except for 1989. At two points [the Communists] converge with the (conservative) New Democracy Party’.

In explaining this anomaly, Budge and Klingemann (2001: 33-4) maintained that the ideological convergence of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) with the conservative New Democracy (ND) can be explained by the fact that the two parties formed a coalition government in 1989. This argument, however, could be valid only if the two parties converged in 1989, which is not the case. In the data provided, the two parties converge in 1985 and again in 1996 but not in 1989, where in fact the ideological distance between them is the greatest reached in the entire 1974-96 period. This selective reading of the estimates and the misinterpretation of the 1989 coalition as an explanatory factor of the ‘observed’ ideological convergence between what has been consistently described as a Stalinist Communist party (e.g. Hanley 2008: 140) and a conservative party, is a prime example of the procrustean use of an argument in order to fit biased data. Similarly, in a more in-depth
analysis, Konstantinidis (2004) attempted to reconcile the findings with common knowledge about Greek politics with little success. As is often the case in such instances, the justification for this discrepancy focused on the case rather than on the theory: the failure of the model to depict on a plausible manner the positions and the trajectories of Greek parties during the last three decades was largely attributed to some eccentricities of the Greek party system. To be sure, although such particularities possibly existed until the mid 1980s (see Clogg, 1987) they are unlikely to account for the inconsistency observed until the mid 1990s.

Since these problems of face validity were identified, several political scientists tried to find out ‘what went wrong’. Gabel and Huber (2000) believe that the solution lies in using a uniform encompassing L-R dimension for all countries in the data set. The explanation of Laver (2001b: 73) is different as he argues that the problem lies in the fact that ‘despite being concerned fundamentally with the salience of different policy concerns [CMP data] have been used in practice to derive estimates of party positions’, a point that has been also taken by Franzmann and Kaiser (2006).

In an attempt to examine these arguments about face validity, we have employed all the aforementioned methods to construct a unifying L-R dimension for Greece, with the CMP data (Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2007) for the period between 1974 and 2000.

Before proceeding into the analysis, however, we need to consider the usefulness of employing this intuitive test of face validity. To start with, we have to speculate about whether and the extent to which a party manifesto should reflect and reproduce prior intuitions. In other words, if parties do not reflect their positions in their manifestos, then any method of measuring party positions with manifesto data will fail to confirm the established patterns, simply because the initial data are not valid.

There are two reasons why a manifesto might not reflect always the party’s true positions. The first has to do with the distribution of the ideological spectrum within a given political context. As Bartolini and Mair (1990: 199) have argued, in contexts where ideological differences between parties are clear, party manifestos might not prove reliable indicators of their positions because parties which are clearly differentiated in ideological grounds have enough freedom to present a slightly or even substantially different policy image. This is sometimes the case of extreme parties which, having distinguished themselves from mainstream parties in every-day political discourse, are in position to present more middle-to-the-road policy stances, avoiding any explicit expression of those policy views that have characterized them as extreme. Inversely, in countries where ideological differences are only small, parties need to differentiate themselves in policy terms, something which is then reflected in their manifestos. For instance, the relatively greater success of the CMP estimates in Great Britain—a country with many valence issues according to Franzmann and Kaizer (2006: 180)—rather than in Italy, can be also attributed to this pattern. We take this argument into account by performing a case study analysis where contextual particularities can be taken into consideration in a more explicit way.

A second reason might be that parties produce manifestos not in order to present their policies but in order to shape voters’ perceptions about their future policy stances (see Pelizzo, 2003). Apart from the fact that this argument is partially
Figure 3. Greek parties’ positions according to the ‘standard’ CMP method (Laver and Budge, 1992). Note: In all methods, the resulting scales have been recoded so as to range between 0 (extreme left) and 10 (extreme right).

based on the contested assumption that voters do indeed read parties’ manifestos, at least in the case of Greece it leads to non-distinguishable empirical implications. If parties design their electoral programmes in order to shape voters’ attitudes about their future issue stances, we should expect voters’ perceptions about parties’ ideological positions to correlate more with lagged rather than contemporaneous parties’ positions estimated with manifesto data. In testing this possibility, we find that parties’ positions correlate equally with voters’ both contemporaneous and lagged ideological perceptions about the parties (the results are available in the online Appendix, see fn. 4). This implies that the counter-argument of shaping voters’ attitudes as opposed to reflecting the party’s stances cannot explain potential distortions between the findings and what we already know about the parties, since the results under both scenarios would look identical.

For all these reasons, we do believe that we should expect a broad convergence between parties’ manifestos and prior intuitions about their positions. Our prior knowledge should be nevertheless based on the available secondary literature which not only looks at parties’ published documents (such as manifestos) and policy record, but also takes into account the general political context in which parties operate. This is exactly how we try to evaluate the findings from the different methods. To be sure, various inconsistencies might be due to the manifestos themselves
or simply due to random error. This is why we only concentrate on inconsistencies which not only cannot be attributed to the data (since there is inconsistency between the estimates based on the same data) but which also contradict previous literature and widespread convictions about the relative locations of parties. Figures 3–8 display the findings according to each of the proposed methods.

Looking at the left of the political spectrum, we would expect to find the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) to the right of the communist party (KKE). Although PASOK has been one of the most leftist Socialist parties in Europe, with evident aspects of populism, anti-Americanism and anti-western orientations (Moschonas, 2002), KKE managed to earn the title of one of the most radical Communist parties in Western Europe (Bosco, 2001; Hanley, 2008). Moreover, PASOK lost much of its radicalism since it went into office in 1981 (Spourdalakis, 1988), therefore we should expect to find it placed to the right of KKE at least since the mid-1980s. Surprisingly enough, this finding is consistent only with the ‘a-theoretical’ ‘vanilla method’ (Gabel and Huber, 2000), at the cost, however, of equating in various instances the socialists with a typical Conservative right-wing party, as ND was at least until 1985. For most of the other methods, there is either constant ‘leap-frogging’ between the two parties (‘domestic’, ‘two-stage FA’, ‘inductive’ methods), or PASOK appears steadily to the left of KKE (as in ‘standard’ and ‘regression’ methods). Moving to the period until 1995, according to the ‘standard’ method, ND, which appears to move drastically its position from election to election, finds itself into the same ideological position with KKE, both in 1985 and
Figure 5. Greek parties’ positions according to the ‘two-stage factor-analysis’ method (Budge, 1987)

1996. This is probably because for some reason the Communists appear extremely centrist in comparison with what one would anticipate.⁶

As we have already noted, Budge and Klingemann (2001: 33–4) attributed this ‘ideological convergence’ between KKE and ND to the 1989 coalition government. As Pridham and Verney (1991) amply demonstrated, however, the 1989 coalition among ND, KKE, EAR (a KKE Euro-communist splinter) and DIANA (a short-lived ND splinter party) was necessitated by the surfacing of major financial scandals involving several ministers of the governing PASOK. The short lived government that was formed (July to October 1989) was essentially a caretaker government with a specific mission to facilitate the criminal proceedings against PASOK ministers. Regardless of the motives that drove this rather unusual coalition, however, there is no indication that it stemmed from a more substantial convergence between the two parties in ideological terms. It is also rather intriguing how the

⁶A different argument that would also justify the placement of PASOK to the left of KKE has to do with the item composition of the constructed scales. Given that all L-R scales also include non-economic issues, with PASOK being presumably more liberal, one would expect it to emphasize more than KKE leftist non-economic issues. Although this argument contradicts with the depiction of PASOK as a populist party, we test it by taking only economic issues into account (in a summated rating scale along the lines of the ‘standard’ method). Still we find PASOK to the left of KKE. Alternatively, we take the issue of Democracy, a typical left non-economic issue. In all this period and with the single exceptions of 1977 and 2000, KKE refers more to this issue than PASOK does (all the results are available in the online Appendix). Thus, at least for the ‘standard’ method, this argument cannot justify the observed inconsistency in the findings.
‘standard’ method finds such a zig-zag in such a short period (1989–90). It is also confusing that in 1996 it regards *Synaspismos* as the most right-wing party of the country, together with a nationalist ND splinter, Political Spring (POLAN).

Thus far the analysis would probably appear biased against the estimates based on the ‘standard’ method. Besides, it is probably very demanding to expect from a simple coding procedure to capture ‘true’ parties’ positions through their manifestos. In fact, it is worth mentioning some rather unexpectedly positive aspects of some of the estimates presented in the figures. To start with, no matter the starting point, all methods capture PASOK’s right-wing shift especially after 1993. Most of them also indicate ND’s shift to neo-liberal policies during the 1990-3 term. Furthermore, both *Ethniki Parataxi* (an extreme right party) in 1977 and, DIKKI (a populist PASOK splinter) in the mid-1990s are correctly placed by most methods. POLAN, with some exceptions is also typically found near to ND, often to its right. Finally, KKE’s gradual move towards the extreme left is also reflected by all methods.

All that leads to a rather familiar but ambiguous picture. As is usually the case, although for some methods face validity speaks more against than in favour (‘domestic’, ‘standard’), for most methods a mixed pattern is observed. Instead of choosing one of the models regarding our presumptions about which generally seems to perform best, we prefer to let the experts and the voters do so. This takes us back to the issue of convergent validity. We try to assess empirically the convergent validity of the methods by evaluating them against measures of party positions.

![Graph showing the ideological positions of Greek parties](image-url)
taken both by expert surveys and by voters’ perceptions. Our goal here is not to evaluate CMP data estimates against other measures. Rather, we are interested in investigating how CMP estimates from different computation methods perform against each other, measured against the same benchmark.

Unfortunately, we could only gather information for 23 cases (parties*elections) of expert surveys’ estimates about Greek parties’ positions. Moreover, there is no available source of voters’ perceptions about parties’ ideological stances during this period. Thus, we resort to a more indirect strategy, which involves the extrapolation of parties’ positions by the position of their voters by using the Euro-Barometer data. The measure we used to infer each party’s ideological position is the interpolated median in the L-R item of those respondents who declared their intention to vote for this party.8


In order to validate this method we used two additional datasets, the 1999 and 2004 European Election Studies (EES). Both surveys ask respondents to locate both themselves and parties in a 1–10 L-R dimension. In the 2004 survey, the correlation between the median position of voters of a given party and the median position of the positions at which voters attached their party is .97. Furthermore, as this could not be identified by a simple correlation but still question the validity of the extrapolation strategy, no significant difference was found in the mean positions between

Figure 7. Greek parties’ positions according to the ‘inductive’ method (Laver and Budge, 1992)
The first row of Table 2 shows how each of the measures correlates with the findings from the expert surveys. For the moment we only focus on the interval-level correlations, shown in the entries of the cells. Importantly, apart from the existing variation and although there are some methods which reach rather high correlation with the results from the experts (‘two-stage FA’, ‘regression’ methods) the latter are more highly correlated with voters’ perceptions. The results from the second row are more encouraging since they suggest that with the usual exception of the ‘standard’ and ‘domestic’, all other methods attain a relatively high relationship with voters’ ideological positions. An interesting pattern that emerges from table 2 is that, for all methods, CMP estimates correlate better with voter perceptions compared to expert surveys. These differences, however, are relatively small when compared to the differences among different methods. The next rows show the correlation between the CMP results across all different methods used in this analysis. With the exception of ‘domestic’, which seems to correlate poorly with other methods, all other correlations appear significant and, reassuringly, positive. With the exception of a few (6 out of 15) correlations that go beyond .75, the level of the association is not as great as it would be expected. The mean correlation between all measures is .553, and it becomes .693 when the ‘domestic’ method is excluded. This implies that although there is enough convergence between the different methods, they do not share in average more than half of their variance. Although this...
Table 2. Correlations among CMP estimates, expert surveys and voters’ perceptions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voters</th>
<th>Standard</th>
<th>Two-Stage FA</th>
<th>Vanilla</th>
<th>Regression</th>
<th>Domestic</th>
<th>Inductive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experts</td>
<td>.827</td>
<td>.471</td>
<td>.781</td>
<td>.631</td>
<td>.623</td>
<td>.667</td>
<td>.806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voters</td>
<td>.571</td>
<td>.778</td>
<td>.392</td>
<td>.623</td>
<td>.458</td>
<td>.460</td>
<td>.460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard</td>
<td></td>
<td>.429</td>
<td>.596</td>
<td>.767</td>
<td>.788</td>
<td>.847</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-stage FA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.392</td>
<td>.767</td>
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<td>Vanilla</td>
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<td>Regression</td>
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</tbody>
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N = 38 for correlations between CMP estimates; 20 for expert surveys and 29 for voters’ perceptions. Entries are Pearson correlations; entries in italics are polychoric (polyserial for the case of experts and voters) correlations. * denotes a non-significant 95% correlation.

threshold should be too high for different variables in a typical regression analysis, it is probably modest when it refers to different measures of the same concept. It is probably problematic to find that by selecting different combinations and implementing different manipulations to the same data one comes up with different outcomes. As was made also clear by the figures, it matters substantially which measure is to be adopted, since this can lead to considerably different results. This is even the case if we relax the assumption of linear relationships in the data and focus on ordinal-level consistency. Attributing to parties integers from 1 (most left) to 5 (most right) according to their observed sequence in the L-R dimension, polychoric correlations (shown in italics) reflect again this partial inconsistency (7 out of 15 correlations greater than .75).

CONCLUSION: WHICH METHOD IS THE WINNER?

If there is an answer to this question, then probably this is not the standard CMP method for the measurement of parties’ positions in general (Budge and Klingemann, 2001) or in the case of Greece more specifically (Konstantinidis, 2004). Beyond that, to argue that either the ‘a-theoretical’ ‘vanilla method’ or the ‘regression’ method (which similarly relaxes the ‘valence issue’ assumption of CMP coding) performs better, becomes a rather subjective and probably not very useful enterprise. What is most important, however, is that by analyzing most of the employed methods in terms of their reliability and validity, we find substantial divergence between the methods. This finding questions the robustness of results based on only one of the measures. Given that there is no particular method that clearly outperforms all others, it seems that it is pivotal for studies which employ the CMP data to subject their analysis in sensitivity testing.

Of course, this is not to say that the CMP data are no good. Quite the opposite is true. They display a remarkable wealth of information which runs through a long time series and constitute the most systematic attempt to measure parties’ positions during such a large period. In effect, as we already mentioned, this has established ‘salience’ as the *prima facie* method of estimating policy positions of political parties using their manifestos. Nevertheless, to paraphrase King (1990: 11), knowing that one is using the most established method in the field to estimate parties’ L-R positions ‘is comforting but insufficient’. What is needed is to communicate precisely how different methods work and how different methods affect the results we get. As King (1990: 11) suggested, ‘we should ask of every new
estimator: “what did it do to the data?”’. However, this can only be done on a case to case basis.

By applying this ‘King criterion’ we have studied the reliability and validity of different L-R estimates for political parties in Greece. Our contribution should be therefore viewed as part of the recent critical literature that uses case studies for illustrative purposes in order to highlight the pitfalls and inconsistencies and suggest remedies (e.g. Pelizzo, 2003; Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006). The close inspection of the Greek party system suggested that the implausible CMP estimates might actually stem from the particular method that has been chosen. Our contribution to the general debate thus is our suggestion that researchers aiming to place parties on the L-R scale by using manifesto data should not only inspect the available alternatives, even within the CMP framework, but also supplement and corroborate the estimates with evidence from different sources such as expert and mass surveys (see also Marks, 2007). Furthermore, whether it seems simplistic or not, lacking other means for the evaluation of competing methods for the estimation of parties’ positions, an additional criterion for their validation should be the extent to which they reproduce pre-existing patterns or, at least, refrain from contradicting well established intuitions. The consideration of different methods that make use of CMP data, along with the examination of the estimates’ convergent (through triangulation) and face (through case study) validity is probably the best receipt for finding one’s way within the puzzles of party positioning.

References


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