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The Impact of Mixed-Member Proportional Representation in Scotland and Wales: Lessons from Germany?

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The Impact of Mixed-member Proportional Representation in Scotland and Wales: Lessons from Germany?*

Abstract: This paper examines whether the mixed-member electoral system influences the partisan and constituency roles assumed by members of two German state parliaments using a postal survey. Comparisons are made to members of the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales, first elected in 1999, using a very similar system. Most literature on German legislators suggests that there is no “class” distinction between those directly elected from constituencies and those indirectly-elected from party lists, although some recent scholarship disagrees. While members of the German and British assemblies are very active as far as constituency service is concerned (and are very partisan), constituency members are somewhat more oriented towards constituencies, and believe that they serve constituents better than their list counterparts. In Germany, the distinction between constituency and list members’ constituency and partisan orientations is more pronounced than in Scotland and Wales, and there are also observable differences between members of the major and minor parties, as some literature suggests. The main difference between German and British assembly members lies in the extent to which the “shadowing” of constituency members by their list colleagues is tolerated; German constituency members are far more tolerant than their British counterparts, whose disdain for list members has caused problems for the new system in Scotland and Wales.

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Introduction

Devolution of power in Britain to the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales has changed the British constitution in many ways. One important change is found in how the newly devolved legislatures are elected. For the first time in the United Kingdom's history, a form of proportional representation (PR), known locally as the Additional Member System, has been used. Referred to elsewhere as Mixed-member Proportional (MMP), variations on this model, based on that of the German Bundestag, have been adopted by many countries around the world recently. Mixed-member electoral systems are usually characterised by the election of some deputies in single-member constituencies while others are elected from party lists using some form of PR. The introduction of the mixed-member system to Britain, however, has been very controversial, not only due to a cultural distaste for the coalition or minority governments that are likely to arise, but also because of fears that mixed-member PR creates two "classes" of representatives. The main fear is that representatives indirectly elected from party lists, rather than directly elected in single-member constituencies, will be more oriented towards their parties than the voters. The same concern has also arisen in New Zealand, where list members, who comprise almost half the membership of the House of Representatives, "have been referred to as 'second-class' by the media, parliamentary colleagues and the public alike" (Ward 1998:127). In Germany, however, it is generally assumed that representatives elected from party lists are not tarred with any second-class status, although scholarly investigations into the existence of any distinction between the two types of legislators have been infrequent.

Does MMP really create two classes of representatives? More specifically, does the mixed electoral system have an adverse effect on the constituency role of those elected from party lists? How do MMP-elected legislators handle the competition that arises from serving constituents in the same geographical areas? This study compares the constituency and partisan roles of the members of the Scottish Parliament to their counterparts in two German federal state parliaments. A selection of quantitative results from a postal survey of these legislators is reported, along with some open-ended comments and excerpts from interviews. The assumption is that rational representatives will anticipate that the constituency service demands of members elected under list PR systems will be lower than those of single-member constituency members because the former are better able to "shirk" constituency demands, according to the terminology of Shaun Bowler and David Farrell (1993:54-55). This could be called the "electoral incentives" hypothesis.

Therefore, I expect that representatives elected from single-member constituencies will assume more of an ombudsman's role, providing more frequent constituency service than list members, and the former should view this service as more important to their careers (and re-election prospects) than their list counterparts. Single-member constituency members should spend more time dealing with the problems of constituents than list members, and should place a higher degree of importance on responding to such demands. Party list members, on the other hand, should spend less time on the needs of constituents and more time on enhancing the strength of the party and working on party activities in the elected assemblies (tasks not as visible to voters as constituency service). If party list members seek to serve constituents, it is more likely that such constituents will be the non-geographical variety, in the form of interest groups,

as suggested by Patzelt (1999). To account for the role of political culture in the behaviour and attitudes of legislators, comparisons between German and British assembly members are made.

The results of the study are mixed, and only lend support to the electoral incentives hypothesis in the case of Germany. While all legislators have a strong attachment to their parties, the Germans elected from party lists have a stronger partisan role, by some indicators, than their counterparts elected in single-member constituencies. This result is not the case in Scotland and Wales, however, indicating that the electoral incentives hypothesis does not hold for British representatives, except in the finding that list-elected representatives in Britain are more likely to treat interest groups as constituents (“constituencies of interest”) than their counterparts elected in single-member constituencies. Results show that the constituency role is firmly entrenched in the British political tradition, and that party list representatives work very hard to serve constituents, even if those constituents are not located in the conventional, small geographical area that British representatives are accustomed to working in. Results are further complicated by the finding that list-elected representatives in Scotland and Wales often “shadow” representatives in single-member constituencies, leading to friction in cases where this practice is resented. The practice of shadowing could be viewed as contributing to the confirmation of the electoral incentives hypothesis. However, one should question why it is that party list-elected representatives would try so hard to become elected in single-member constituencies at the next election when it would be more rational simply to consolidate their positions high on the party list. The practice of shadowing, then, could also be seen as a result of a cultural preference for being elected in single-member constituencies that does not exist to the same degree in Germany.

Constituency service in Britain

British references to party list representatives as “second class” reflect a received wisdom among many Anglo-Saxon politicians, voters, and political scientists that multi-member constituencies dilute the relationship between members of Parliament (MPs) and their constituents (Wheare 1963:72). Behind this thinking is the expectation that MPs will act as non-partisan advocates for their constituents, regardless of whether a constituent voted for him or her at the last election—British voters and elected representatives alike value constituency service highly (Searing 1994; Norton and Wood 1993). Their understanding of non-partisan constituency service was illustrated during a debate on office allowances by a member of the Scottish Parliament (MSP) who argued that single-member constituency MSPs deserve larger office allowances because “problems are not party political” and voters would bring their problems to their single-member constituency MSP, not to MSPs from the regional list, meaning that list MSPs would need less of an allowance (Scotland 1999: col 304). A related concern on the part of the constituency members is that the list members will spend time focusing on sexy issues to publicise in their electoral regions, cherry-picking the most glamorous cases from their large electoral regions while constituency members are stuck dealing with more mundane cases. Even worse for constituency members, party list members may target individual constituencies for “extra” attention because they plan to stand in that constituency against the incumbent member, a practice called shadowing. A panel study of 13 MSPs noted the presence of friction between constituency and list members early on, often over who is entitled to

casework (McCabe and McCormick 2000). There seems to be less of a problem in Wales, possibly because there are far fewer list members relative to constituency members.

Furthermore, there is a widely held fear among some politicians that representatives elected from party lists will be more accountable to the political party that selects candidates and ranks those lists than to voters. In House of Commons debates on the establishment of the Scottish Parliament, Labour MP Ian Davidson argued that “First-class [constituency] Members will be accountable for their selection and election to real people, whereas there is some doubt about exactly to whom second-class [list] Members will be accountable” (United Kingdom House of Commons Debates 1998, vol 304: col 74). Constituency members seem to fear that the “extra” time list members have (supposedly free from doing constituency service) will be spent currying favour in the party to assure the highest list position possible in order to guarantee their re-election, while constituency members must face the public, making them more accountable, in their view.

Not everyone predicts that dire consequences will arise from PR in Scotland and Wales. Those who advocate mixed-member systems point to the advantage of retaining the single-member constituency, with its potential for *personal* representation and accountability, combined with *proportional* representation on a partisan basis, to reflect more accurately how voters cast their votes. Matthew Shugart and Martin Wattenberg, in their edited volume *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?*, state that “the best of both worlds could be summarized as disciplined national parties whose individual legislators can be held accountable for their articulation of local interests” (2001:582). In other words, these authors argue that PR is associated with cohesive, national parties with coherent policy programmes, while plurality voting in single-member constituencies should encourage representatives to focus on their geographical area through the mechanism of personal accountability. Therefore, MMP is seen as the ideal way to personalise PR by some political scientists and commentators, particularly in countries with a strong tradition of constituency representation. Among this community are British political scientists Patrick Dunleavy and Helen Margetts, who argue that mixed-member systems will give “the accountability strengths of plurality rule in single-member constituencies with the offsetting proportional qualities of regional or national lists” (1995:26).

The debate over the merits of MMP for devolved British assemblies is likely to continue. What is not controversial is that representatives have different roles to play in the political system. Recent studies by Donald Searing (1985; 1994) indicate that there are many roles assumed by British MPs, while Philip Norton and David Wood (1993) narrow these roles down to two broad categories or “faces” of MPs: local non-partisan constituency service and national party policy advocacy. The introduction of mixed-member electoral systems, requiring the introduction of list PR members, in addition to MPs elected by plurality voting, presents the opportunity for these MP roles to be formally split, thus allowing a study of how MPs develop their roles along constituency and partisan lines. This is also an opportunity to investigate the broader issue of which influence—that of culture or institutional rules—has a larger impact upon the assumption and formation of representative roles. As noted above, British political culture places a great deal of value on the non-partisan constituency service role of elected representatives. However, one could also argue that institutional rules have a strong

impact on how politicians behave. This line of reasoning holds that because constituency members are directly elected by voters, they should be expected to focus on constituency service more than members elected from regional lists ranked by the party hierarchy (Cain *et al.* 1987; Bowler and Farrell 1993).

One way to examine the relative impact of cultural and institutional factors on the behaviour of politicians is to look at another example of MMP in a different cultural setting. Germany, the model for most mixed-member systems, has used MMP since the late 1940s for its federal and most state elections. If institutional rules are significant in determining how politicians behave, then they should work the same way in many different cultural contexts. The widely-held perception of political scientists and commentators is that German voters and politicians do not distinguish between constituency and list members; there is no “caste” system in which one type of representative is seen as more legitimate than the other (Burkett 1985:130). However, role studies of German legislators that distinguish between constituency and list members have only recently been undertaken (Lancaster and Patterson 1990; Patzelt 1999; Klingemann and Wessels 2001).

The German model

The case of Germany can help resolve the question of whether institutional rules or traditional values have a greater impact in the formation of partisan and constituency roles by elected representatives. If representatives (and voters) are rational actors, and institutions matter, then institutional rules should operate in a way that is independent of the cultural or historical setting. Therefore, a country like Germany, which had little tradition of constituency service before the introduction its mixed-member electoral system, would serve as a useful comparative model, particularly since the British occupation authorities insisted upon a “system [which] would build and strengthen the ties between the members of parliament and the citizens” (Kaase 1984:162).

Germany’s Reichstag did use single-member constituencies for the election of its deputies from 1871 to 1918, with universal male suffrage, but under a double ballot runoff system that penalised the Social Democrats (Jesse 2000:125). When universal suffrage was granted with the introduction of the Weimar Republic, a large constituency, closed-list PR system was deliberately chosen by Social Democratic and leftist Liberal leaders to undermine the grip of conservative local bourgeois elites so that “There was no possible way for a deputy to be connected with a district” (Suval 1985:249). Consequently, there were complaints about the impersonal and remote nature of the relationship between Reichstag deputies and their constituents, and attempts were made to reform the system in the direction of greater personalisation before the rise of the National Socialists and the demise of Weimar (Jesse 2000:126). After Germany’s defeat in the Second World War, British occupation zone administrators insisted on reversing what they considered to be an impersonal representative tradition by requiring that municipal elections held in 1946 be predominantly candidate based, but they conceded a party list PR element at the request of the parties (Ebsworth 1960:53-5). The resulting hybrid became the model for the contemporary mixed system (although imperial Germany and Denmark briefly used mixed-member systems before 1920). The mixed candidate/party list system was later used for all federal state parliament (Landtag)

elections in the British occupation zone, while military governments in the American and French zones allowed “pure” list PR (Ebsworth 1960:61-2).

The British-inspired compromise model caught on with German authorities, however, so that later the first Bundestag election in 1949 used an electoral system based on that of the Landtag of Lower Saxony, in the British zone (Ebsworth 1960:65; 75). The current system used for the Bundestag and most federal state assemblies (Landtage) involves a vote for a candidate in a single-member constituency (with the winner chosen by plurality), and another vote for a party list (ranked by statewide party organisations). Candidates from state lists are elected in numbers that make the total number of representatives (constituency and list members added together), on a partisan basis, proportional to the party vote tallied nationally. The electoral systems used in Scotland and Wales differ from the German model mainly in that list members are elected from lists in regions (eight in Scotland and five in Wales), while German list members are elected on a statewide basis in both Bundestag and Landtag elections. The Scottish and Welsh electoral regions are about the size of eight Westminster constituencies; Scottish regions elect seven party list members, while Welsh regions only elect four list members. Both the British and the German systems do take constituency members already won by a party into account when allocating list (“additional”) members to a party, however.

Whether Germany’s mixed system of constituency and party list representatives actually does enhance the relationship voters have with those they elect is the subject of some dispute in the literature. Max Kaase, a German critic, argues “the initial expectations in designing the personalized PR system with respect to citizen deputy ties have certainly not materialized” (1984:163). British critic Charlie Jeffery agrees, claiming that “a continuous link between voters and MPs in a particular area does not have the significance attached to constituency representation in the UK” (Jeffery 1998:246). Some authors criticise the electoral system for not being genuinely personalised, while others claim that Germans historically take their grievances to officials other than elected representatives. In either instance, critics would claim that there is no justification for the mixed electoral system. Ultimately, the main observation is that Germans citizens generally do not distinguish between directly elected and party list representatives, and there is no “caste” system in which one type of representative is seen as more legitimate than the other (Burkett 1985:130). In fact, dual candidacy (constituency candidates being on party lists as well to ensure election) is common, with the “losing” candidate in the direct constituency elections often winning a Bundestag seat from that constituency’s *Land* party list. This phenomenon is one reason why Eckhard Jesse states that the voter “does not perceive the difference at all” between the two different types of representatives (Jesse 1988:120).

However, Vernon Bogdanor is exaggerating when he asserts that “Members of the Bundestag, unlike elected representatives in Britain, are not expected to involve themselves in constituency work” (1999:225). German political scientist Werner Patzelt reports that in Germany, “it is obvious that for an MP the constituency work is a critical part of holding his office. Consequently, the representatives devote about one-third of their working hours to constituency work” (Patzelt 1997:60). Indeed, Patzelt’s research reveals that constituent demands are so great that Bundestag members “are expected to act as ombudsmen with far more rigour than they feel should be expected of them” (Patzelt 1997:72). Furthermore, Germans approach both party list and constituency

representatives, with both types receiving similar amounts of correspondence (Burkett 1985:129). Which representative is contacted by citizens seems to depend on party identification: “If ‘their’ party lost in the constituency they may prefer to approach the List deputy of that party, especially if he or she was the unsuccessful candidate of the party in that constituency” (Burkett 1985:129). “Losing” constituency candidates who end up being elected via the party list often shadow the candidate who defeated them, setting up shop in the same constituency.

While most accounts of the German electoral system state that there is no difference in the status of party list and constituency representatives, some scholars say there is a difference between the role orientations and behaviour of representatives. New evidence from Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Bernhard Wessels shows that party list and constituency members of the Bundestag differ with respect to both the style and focus of representation, causing the authors to conclude that “type of mandate makes a difference for role orientation” (Klingemann and Wessels 2001:292). An earlier study by Thomas Lancaster and David Patterson found that “district type affects representatives’ perceptions of pork barrel allocations as a special type of constituency service” (Lancaster and Patterson 1990:458). Werner Patzelt writes that Bundestag members elected in single-member constituencies “regard themselves more as successful representatives of the citizens, clearly invest more time in constituency work, and engage much more in case work and constituency service” than their list-elected colleagues (1999:37). However, Patzelt goes on to say that those major party members who were defeated in single-member constituency races but enter the Bundestag or Landtage as list members behave like directly elected constituency members (1999:38-9). The main behavioural differences appear to exist between the deputies of major (Social Democrat and Christian Democrat) and minor parties (including the Greens, the Free Democrats, and eastern Germany’s Party of Democratic Socialism); the latter are more focused on interest groups and policy making than on geographical constituencies, largely due to the simple fact that they have fewer MPs (Patzelt 1999:39).

Results: How Germany differs from Scotland and Wales

In order to test the electoral incentives hypothesis, a postal survey was used to gather information from members of German and British legislatures. Two German Landtage, those of Brandenburg and Hesse, were chosen because they use the two-vote electoral system used by the Bundestag, as well as the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales. The survey was a German translation of the questionnaire sent to members of the two British legislatures. The overall German survey response rate was 46.6%, with a slightly higher response from Hesse (49.1%, compared to 43.5% for Brandenburg), and from party list members (53.1%, compared to 41.9% for constituency members). For the British assemblies, the overall response rate was 39.8%, with a similar response in both Scotland and Wales. There was a difference between the response rate for constituency and list representatives, as in Germany, with 30.8% of Scottish and Welsh constituency responding, compared to 52.7% of list members.

As far as contact with voters is concerned, the German Landtag members surveyed held almost the same number of surgeries, whether they were elected in single-member constituencies or from party lists (Table 1, Part A). In fact, there is a significant difference between list and constituency members in Scotland and Wales (at the.01

level), suggesting that constituency members in Britain have somewhat more contact with voters. Similar results were obtained by Philip Cowley and Stephen Lochore in their study of MSPs (2000:183). On other matters relating to constituency service however, only the German deputies show significant differences between their constituency and list representatives, or between major and minor party deputies. The portion of work time spent helping voters with their problems, while lower in Germany (a weighted average of 10.4%, compared to 16.3% in Scotland and Wales), shows a significant difference between major (SPD and CDU) and minor (PDS, Green, FDP, and DVU) party members, at 11.4% and 5.7% respectively (Table 1, Part B). The difference between constituency and list members, however, was not significant, as was the case in Scotland and Wales. However, most minor party deputies are elected from party lists. On “pork barrel” politics, differences significant at the .01 level do exist between German constituency and list members, as far as local promotion and project seeking are concerned (Table 1, Parts C and D). While these results are similar to those of Lancaster and Patterson (1990) in their Bundestag member research, the same cannot be said for Scottish and Welsh representatives, who spent a comparable amount of their work time on these “pork barrel” activities.

Questions about the importance of a legislator’s tasks give results that reveal significant differences between constituency and list members, and between major and minor party deputies in Germany. Table 2 shows that a difference exists, at the .05 level, between major and minor party deputies on their responses to the importance of representing the collective views of their voters. The same difference exists between constituency and list members, as well as major and minor party deputies, on the issue of enacting the party’s manifesto commitments into law. The .05 level difference is again present on the matter of enhancing the party’s strength, but only between constituency and list members. These differences suggest that in Germany, minor party and list-elected representatives are somewhat more oriented towards their parties than constituency members. On all of these points raised as potentially important tasks for legislators, there was no statistically significant difference between constituency and list members in Scotland and Wales. The potential for conflict between constituency and partisan roles was examined by a question asking legislators what their primary motivation for standing for office was (Table 3). A significant difference, at the .05 level, is present between the responses of German constituency and list representatives, suggesting that list members are more motivated by policy and partisan goals. The difference between constituency and list members in Scotland and Wales was not statistically significant, and the response “serving the needs of your constituents/voters” was given by over 55% of British representatives, compared to 40.4% of German Landtag members.

Other survey results, however, show significant differences between constituency and list members in both Germany and in Scotland and Wales. When questioned as to how important their success in obtaining projects for their constituencies or regions was to their re-election prospects, there were highly significant differences between German Landtag constituency and list members, as well as between major and minor party deputies (Table 4, Part A). There was also a difference, significant at the .05 level, between the responses from Scottish and Welsh constituency and list members. The same difference between the two types of German and British members exists in response to how important helping voters is to their re-election prospects (Part B of Table 4). On both of these questions, representatives in Scotland and Wales attach more importance to the

activity addressed. When asked about obtaining projects for their constituency or federal state (*Land*), 20.2% of Landtag members said it was very important to their re-election prospects, while 54.2% of their Scottish and Welsh counterparts responded the same way. As far as helping people who have problems with government agencies, 36% of Landtag members consider this very important to their re-election, while 54.2% of Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly members feel the same way. For all the representatives, there seems to be an electoral incentive to serve constituents, but it appears to be stronger for those directly elected in single-member constituencies, particularly in Scotland and Wales.

Remarkable similarities are found again among German and British representatives' attitudes towards the electoral system, assessed by asking about how they feel about each other. Responses from German Landtag members (Table 5A) and those from the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly (Table 5B) reveal that most constituency members agree or agree strongly that members elected from single-member constituencies are more accountable to voters than party list members, while the opposite is true for list members. In Germany, 67.5% of constituency members agree or agree strongly with the statement (compared to 26.6% of list members), while 90.0% of their counterparts in Scotland and Wales feel the same way (compared to 28.2% of list members). The difference between the two types of members' responses is significant at the .01 level for both the German and British results. While both constituency and list members agree or strongly agree that both types of member are equally representative of their people, the difference between constituency and list member responses is again significant at the .01 level. Among German constituency members, 62.5% agree or agree strongly with the statement (compared to 93.9% of list members), while 69.7% of Scottish and Welsh constituency members responded the same way (compared to 94.8% of list members). These results show that despite being the products of different political cultures, both German and British representatives have strikingly similar views on the accountability and representative nature of legislators, views that seem to be influenced by their place in the electoral system itself.

Shadowing and constituency service: Germany

Most list members in German legislatures establish some kind of presence, usually by means of an office, in the constituency of a directly elected member. Exactly half of the constituency members who responded to the survey of Brandenburg and Hesse Landtag members (*Mitglied des Landtages*, or MdLs) said they were being shadowed, while 89.9% of the list members admitted to the practice. The positive comments from constituency members about the activities of list members in their constituencies imply that nothing abnormal or unexpected is going on:

An entirely normal occurrence. (HS46)

They are doing their job. (HS43)

These comments are in line with the literature cited above suggesting that shadowing is a common occurrence in Germany; constituency members do not feel threatened by list members who set up shop in their "patch," having been assigned by their parties to

constituencies won by opposition members. The result is that most voters have a member of a party they support looking after their geographical areas, as this Hesse MdL describes:

Every MdL has his own constituency office and looks after his region. The region in which a party has no constituency MdLs, as a rule will be looked after either by a list MdL or by a neighbouring constituency MdL, so that all citizens have an MdL of their party as a contact person (HS13).

In other words, constituency representation in Germany is not a zero sum affair, as is so often the view among British elected representatives. Furthermore, many MdLs, both directly and list-elected, politely repeated the same line about both types of MdL being treated as equals, as exemplified by these Hesse constituency MdLs:

The parliamentary work of a directly elected MdL does not differentiate itself from that of a list MdL. Merely a directly elected MdL is somewhat more bound to 'his' constituency. Most list MdLs also have a constituency assigned to them, however, which they have not won directly themselves (HS45).

The differences between constituency and list MdLs are not very big. In practice everyone works co-operatively together and there are only small differences. It may, for that reason, be repeated yet again that it comes to no kind of tensions between deputies, and they work productively together for the good of the citizens (HS13).

Other comments from directly elected MdLs, while maintaining that there are no major differences between the two types of members, reveal upon closer inspection that perhaps being directly elected makes an MdL a bit more equal, however. The main advantage in being a constituency MdL, as cited by a number of them, was the degree of independence from the state party organisation that comes with direct election. One directly elected Hesse MdL puts it this way:

There are, in my opinion, no great differences between a directly elected MdL and a list-elected MdL. The commitment to the constituency is equal in that both types of MdL are selected by party members in the respective constituency. One difference I could suggest is that a directly elected MdL brings in the interests of the constituency without consideration of state political concerns. A directly elected MdL can confine himself to the representation of his constituency. The commitment to statewide subjects he could set aside, although so far in practice I have not yet seen it (HS6).

Any independence from the party, however, is not likely to be significant, as the above comment suggests, and of course the representative's commitment to the constituency party must be strong to secure re-nomination.

Whatever degree of freedom is achieved for a representative by direct election depends on constituency service for its continuation. Directly elected members take pride in serving their constituents, believing that this service distinguishes them, at least to

some extent, from their list counterparts, as well as giving them a bit more freedom. A constituency member of the Hesse Landtag, writes:

The work of a constituency MdL differs from that of a list MdL as far as constituency care naturally playing a greater role. A constituency MdL tries to be re-elected in the constituency at the next election. That is to say, the workload for a constituency MdL favours the constituency. Beyond that, a constituency MdL is at least a bit freer in his work. In the end he can refer to the fact that he was elected in his constituency and the citizens stand behind him. He has, therefore, as a rule a certain weight and also a somewhat greater independence vis-à-vis the wishes of his party (HS13).

This comment links the directly elected member to his or her constituency, arguing that this linkage does actually help the voters, whose electoral support helps the MdL act more independently than a list member. Such a difference might also confer a higher degree of status upon constituency members.

Shadowing and constituency service: Scotland and Wales

The British experience with shadowing differs from that of Germany. Taking Wales and Scotland together, 48.5% of constituency members responding to the survey claimed they were being shadowed, while 33.3% of list members admitted to the practice. List members often target constituency members they plan to stand against in the constituency part of the next election by establishing a local presence—acting like a shadow constituency member. Christine Chapman, Welsh Assembly constituency member, notes that a regional list member who plans to stand against her next time from the nationalist Plaid Cymru has a rival “constituency office” in her constituency (Chapman 2001). Chapman’s reaction is not to take anything for granted; the competition makes politicians less complacent, which she believes could be good for voters, although perhaps a bit confusing. “If I were a list member, I would work across the region,” and not just concentrate on one constituency, Chapman says (2001).

Relations between other constituency members and their list counterparts are more cordial, however. For Margaret Smith MSP, a degree of shadowing (if it can even be called that) comes from Lord James Douglas Hamilton, who was the Conservative MP for her constituency at Westminster before a fellow Liberal Democrat took the seat in 1997 (Smith 2001). Many constituents remember Lord James, so they go to him if they are Tory voters. He still gets invited to public functions and meetings because of his strong links to the Edinburgh constituency. Smith has no complaints about Lord James’s activities; he advertises as a “Lothians MSP” and does not try to pass himself off as the constituency MSP. Lord James notifies Smith of cases he has taken up from people residing in her constituency, as the parliament’s code of conduct calls for.

Some representatives are simply not being shadowed, either because the constituency is so safe for the incumbent’s party, or because there are not enough list members to go around. Brian Gibbons, a Labour constituency member in south Wales, says that his constituency “wouldn’t be a target for anybody...by the time they got to my constituency they really would be on the way to changing the political face of Wales!” (Gibbons 2001). Because Gibbons is very active in his constituency, he believes that

shadowing him would be a fruitless endeavour for list members. “For example, in the last week I will have been to eight locations in my constituency, providing surgeries and so forth, and I think it would be very difficult for regional list members to provide that level of service. I can do that because this is my patch; if they were trying to compete it would be impossible for them. There’s no point putting a lot of investment in my constituency” (Gibbons 2001).

Other constituency members commented that shadowing from list members did not have a great effect on them, or that they simply took it in their stride. “If they had [shadowed me] I would not be concerned as they have the right to do so” (AM 7), and “Just have to grin and bear it!” (MSP 61) were typical statements from constituency members who did not worry about shadowing. Other statements include the following:

None has an office (to the best of my knowledge) but one does occasionally turn up to meetings/lobbies etc. I always welcome him (he is from another party) and publicly acknowledge his presence and any help he can give me in doing my work. He then usually looks embarrassed! (AM4)

I am quite relaxed about it. They have to cover much wider areas in terms of their representation, so I am confident that they will not be able to give the attention to detail which I can, with an office in the constituency. In time, I believe voters will gravitate to a representative of the party which they voted, when seeking to have a complaint dealt with (MSP33).

Competition and conflict between members: Germany

The linkages German Landtag members have to constituencies indicate that both types of representative are competing for business from voters. Some members view this competition in a positive way, while others are not so pleased with it. Many directly elected members had quite positive comments about the constituency activities of their list counterparts:

Competition enlivens business. (BB27)

In the same party (or coalition partner), it can mean a division of labour and thereby an enhancement. With opposition colleagues, it increases the awareness and is a motivation. (BB23)

These comments see benefits for constituents resulting from the representatives’ competition over service. This tone contrasts with the more negative tone displayed in the comments of constituency members below regarding list members:

It is not crucial whether one is elected directly or through the list. But it is crucial if the constituency deputy lives there. When the deputy is only “visiting,” the effectiveness is small. (BB19)

It may be noteworthy that strong local ties are valued by the MdLs who made the above comments. Furthermore, most of the comments come from SPD constituency members of the Brandenburg Landtag. Perhaps this is explained by the fact that their party holds most

of that legislature's constituency seats, or that the mixed-member electoral system is relatively new in Brandenburg (introduced after the 1990 incorporation of the former German Democratic Republic into the Federal Republic). In any case, there is at least a small amount of displeasure with the activities of list members on the part of directly elected constituency members in Germany.

Competition and conflict between members: Scotland and Wales

While many constituency members in Scotland and Wales do not have a problem with their list counterparts, others clearly do. Some of the more negative comments suggested that there were electoral motivations involved in shadowing:

In my neighbouring constituency the Labour list MSPs have set up an office with a view to challenging him [the incumbent] at the next election (MSP 38).

The Tory MSP in question is not particularly active so he is not a problem. However, the SNP list members divide up the individual constituencies amongst themselves and shadow 2 or 3 each. This has the effect of 'politicising' constituency work. Instead of representing all constituencies equally, you are portrayed as representing only those who support you. This is unnecessary and divisive (MSP42).

[I feel] Very angry. List MSPs are able to cherry pick issues without having to deal with anything like the whole of constituency work. Time is much less 'free' for constituency MSPs (MSP 67).

I support their right to work wherever they like. I do not support their tendency to advertise themselves as a constituency rep. when they are list members (AM9).

Unnecessary and against the intention of proportionality. Surrogate constituency MSPs were not the intention of the AMS system. Furthermore, the target seats are the ones shadowed. It also suggests a list MSP is not as worthwhile as a constituency one (MSP 34).

One theme that emerges from the above comments is the partisan electoral threat felt by some constituency members, as has been noted by other researchers (McCabe and McCormick 2000:45). Some list members, particularly the nationalists, who make up the second-largest party in each assembly, are aiming to take many (mainly Labour) constituency seats at the next election. Because of the multi-member electoral regions (each containing several single-member constituencies within them) created by the mixed-member electoral system, Scottish and Welsh politicians are facing their opponents constantly, even after defeating them in single-member constituency races. In this sense, the shadowing of constituency members could be seen as a rational behaviour for list members who wish to be re-elected by the more traditional (and perhaps prestigious) method in Britain. The constituency service performed by list members, in this somewhat cynical view, is being performed primarily for electoral gain, not out of a desire borne of cultural norms to deal with the sometimes mundane grievances of constituents.

The comments also show that some constituency members feel that list members are intruding upon casework that rightfully belongs to constituency members for the purposes of personal political gain, rather than out of a genuine concern for the welfare of the constituents. Constituency members seem to believe that the services provided to constituents should be somehow above partisanship, and not used as part of a battle between competing politicians. This perspective is perhaps reflected in the survey findings above in which most constituency members deny that list members are providing constituency service. While this finding seems absurd, in light of the evidence that list members *are* serving constituents, constituency members seem to believe that what list members are doing is not really comparable to the “non-partisan” service they believe they provide. In a comment above, MSP42 objects to how list members shadowing constituency members are “politicising” constituency work, as if this is a bad thing, or something that was never the case before. Furthermore, MSP42 finds it “unnecessary and divisive” that members might be “portrayed as representing only those who support” them. In other words, voters who failed to elect a constituency candidate should accept this defeat, because the constituency member will serve everyone, even those who voted against her or him.

Other constituency members are less hostile towards the list members who shadow them. Instead of resenting it, they see this competition, at least grudgingly, as good for the voters:

I think it is unfortunate that we have two types of MSP. Politically, obviously I would rather it hadn't happened. However it may be good for representative democracy (MSP30).

It can be irritating-to-threatening, but is inevitable consequence of the system, so has to be accepted. The answer is to work harder and better for the constituency and constituents (MSP 35).

It makes my day-to-day work much more demanding and pressurised. However, it also makes me work harder and improves the working of democracy in my constituency. Good for the people, bad for the politicians (MSP 70).

Welsh Assembly constituency AM Kirsty Williams comments that because list members target constituencies they plan to contest at the next election, they can be a “real pain in the neck” and even “infuriating,” making constituency members feel like they are in a “constant state of competition and electioneering” (Williams 2001). This competition benefits voters, who now have more choice, maintains Peter Black, a Liberal Democrat list member of the Welsh Assembly. He cites cases of people actually approaching their local councillor, MP, constituency AM, and list AMs, and comparing their “performance” with regard to the concerns brought to their attention (Black 2001). Williams agrees that enhanced choice is good for constituents because “you can't be lazy,” and for the most partisan voters who will never approach a constituency member they voted against, there is the opportunity to deal with “their own” list member:

There may be Conservatives out there who would never come to me in a million years, and why should they be disenfranchised because of a weird electoral

system [single-member plurality]? At least now they've got someone they feel comfortable going to, and I think that's fine (Williams 2001).

The duties of list members: Germany

Representatives elected from party lists in Germany were asked whether they focus their attention upon a geographical region or on organised interests. Many mentioned that they concentrate on both a region and a set of interest groups, while others selected one or the other, or claimed that everyone was treated equally. The most frequent response from list members was that they tried to focus on both a region and interest groups, which were sometimes enumerated:

I concentrate on both the representation of the residents of my constituency and on a specific interest group. (HS29)

Both: Representation of the population in the constituency; Representation of interest groups in the region corresponding to technical emphasis. (HS27)

Even though I was not directly elected, I represent in particular the voters of my constituency. (BB22)

The last comment above is remarkable in that the list member claims to represent the voters of a constituency in which she was (admittedly) not directly elected. Other list members used similar references to "their" constituencies:

I concentrate on the region in which I was elected!! (BB16)

Neither [region] nor [interest group]; I follow my basic convictions. I put the emphasis of my work on my constituency. (BB36)

My county consists of 4 constituencies. I have started first in one constituency—it was uncovered—I have my constituency office there. I am active in the other 3 constituencies. (BB29)

The above comments reflect the high degree of attachment list members in Germany have towards the single-member constituencies in which they perform constituency service. The shadowing by list members of directly elected constituency members is so commonplace and normal that list members do not shrink from claiming geographical areas as their own.

Party list representatives also focus on interest groups with which they have an affinity, either due to the prominence of the group in the community, or because of some personal interest or attribute (occupation or some other qualification) of the deputy. Many of those who commented mentioned that interest groups were more often the focus of a list deputy's attention. Some comments, from the deputies of several parties, are listed below, with the relevant party designation after the comment:

The regional interests are very important, but groups are also...the difference between directly elected and list-elected deputies is not publicly noticed. (HS15) SPD

Local questions stand behind the general subjects. (HS33) Alliance 90/The Greens

I represent mainly a specific interest group, namely those who have decided to be against a multicultural Germany. (BB10) DVU

Mainly agricultural policy and thereby the rural areas. I represent the farmers!!! (BB21) CDU

For many list members, working with organised interests gives the politicians an opportunity to make a difference. One list member of the Hesse Landtag prefers her work to that of a constituency member, finding it more satisfying to focus on special projects (and have time to find solutions for them) than only to shake hands in the area.

For list members from the smallest parties, which generally have few or no directly elected seats, geographical representation must come second to interest group and policy promotion, thanks to the small number of deputies they have. As some MdLs commented:

Here one must differentiate between the representatives of the big and small parties. Deputies from the big parties—regardless of whether they won the constituency or not—look after the citizens considerably more than deputies of the small parties. (HS40)

Small parties' deputies must represent more regions and fields. (HS25)

The above comments are consistent with the expectations in recent literature (Patzelt 1999) about how major and minor party members are likely to differ in how they relate to constituents. The survey data, cited above, also showed statistically significant differences between SPD and CDU members on the one hand, and PDS, Green, FDP, and DVU members on the other, in a number of questions related to constituency service.

The duties of list members: Scotland and Wales

Party list representatives are new elements of the British political system, appearing for the first time in the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales, the Greater London Assembly, and the British (but not Northern Irish) delegation to the European Parliament. Because they are so new, there appears to be some question as to what exactly they should do, particularly regarding constituency representation. Indeed, one list member from Scotland stated “The duties and functions of list MSPs were not thought out by the founders of the Scottish Parliament or the CSG [Consultative Steering Group on the Scottish Parliament]” (MSP45). The lack of guidelines for list members may account for some of the problems encountered with shadowing, and a protocol on how list members should deal with constituents has been added to the Scottish Parliament code of conduct (but nothing similar exists in Wales). This addition to the code of

conduct for MSPs, *Guidance on the Relationships between MSPs*, has been summarised in the Scottish Parliament's Public Information Service leaflet, "You and Your MSPs." The leaflet tells citizens that they "are free to approach any of the eight MSPs who represent" them, and their wishes are the "principal concern" as far as which member they would like to approach (Scotland 2001). However, the leaflet goes on to say that the *Guidance* "envisages that in most circumstances, individual constituents will approach the relevant constituency MSP," and if a regional list MSP is approached instead, "he or she must inform the relevant constituency MSP at the outset," although the citizen can request that this not happen (Scotland 2001).

Regardless of what the *Guidance* envisages, many list members perform traditional constituency service activities, often catering to voters who prefer to deal with someone they voted for (when they failed to elect the constituency member of their choice), as the comments above and survey data show. Because of the large size of their electoral regions, list members often focus on a smaller geographical part of the region, even if they are not strictly shadowing constituency members for the purpose of improving their chances in the constituency part of the next election. In cases where an electoral region has both list and constituency members from the same party, representatives may choose to co-ordinate their activities. Liberal Democrat constituency MSP Iain Smith says he works with the only list member from his party in the electoral region, Keith Raffan, on issues that cross constituency boundaries and affect their entire Mid Scotland and Fife region (Smith 2001). List members are somewhat more likely than their constituency counterparts to work with organised interests, often in areas that match their own expertise or experience.

The following comments from list members provide some idea of how they represent constituents, geographical and otherwise:

I work primarily in 3 constituencies, though I tend to concentrate on the one in which I live. My regional office is in the neighbouring constituency (MSP50).

I travel extensively in Scotland to meet with and encourage all kinds of non-political organisations on a non-political basis (MSP24).

I feel I represent the remote rural way of life and that angle in many of my contributions in the parliament (MSP 27).

When asked how list members go about representing interest groups as non-geographical constituencies, one member countered by saying "Working 'with,' not representing" (MSP39). Several others listed groups that they work with or represent, including the countryside, fisheries, older people, youth, the environment, ethnic/linguistic groups, overseas development, ship building, and victims of abuse.

The activities of list members are limited by the size of their office allowances, however. In Scotland these are smaller than those of a constituency member if a party has more than one list member in a given region (this is not the case in Wales, though). SNP list MSP Andrew Wilson argues that the matter of allowance is highly significant, because Labour tries to maintain its "one party state" in Scotland by reducing the visibility of SNP members (most of whom are elected from party lists) with its imposition

of smaller office allowances (Wilson 2001). He believes that the Labour party leadership is concerned about losing some not-so-safe constituencies their members currently hold to the SNP at the next Scottish Parliament election, and that this explains why Labour fought so hard to limit allowances to list members. In spite of the smaller office allowance, Wilson has set up a telephone hotline for constituents in his Central Scotland electoral region to use when they have problems or questions, and says that he receives calls from voters of all party (or non-party) backgrounds.

While Wilson sees the competition between MSPs brought about by the electoral system as good for the voters, the Labour MSP in a single-member constituency he is shadowing, Cathie Craigie, complained about Wilson's use of the term "your local MSP" on signs and promotional materials in 2001. Craigie took the case to the Scottish Parliament's standards committee, where Wilson agreed to remove the offending word ("local") which was found to be in breach of the parliament's guidelines (Scotland 2001). No sanctions were imposed, however, but BBC Online Scotland reported that such tensions between constituency and list MSPs had led the British government to decide to abolish the eight electoral regions and elect all list members from the 2003 election onwards on a pan-Scotland basis, expecting that "the change would stop list MSPs acting like surrogate constituency MSPs" (2001). Labour hoped that with no electoral regions, list MSPs would have no regional identity and would therefore be more likely to focus on policy matters, rather than shadow targeted Labour constituency members.

The proposed national list system was condemned by the SNP immediately, and all MSPs interviewed by me felt that the BBC report, which was also cited in Scottish newspapers, was simply a "kite" being flown by Westminster to assess the public response in Scotland. The electoral regions were seen as an important way to maintain a regional dimension in the parliament and political system. Margaret Smith, Liberal Democrat constituency MSP, believes that regional lists are good for list member accountability and urban-rural balance, and that national lists might increase party centralisation (Smith 2001). Furthermore, the use of national lists in New Zealand does little or nothing to prevent shadowing of constituency members by their list colleagues. By spring of 2002, the plan had not been implemented, and instead the Scottish media were reporting on a different potential change for the Scottish Parliament—a reduction in seats prompted by the Scotland Act for the parliament to have the same single-member constituencies as exist for Scotland at Westminster. Once again, all MSPs interviewed by me believed that the number of seats would remain at 129, to be retained simply by changing the Scotland Act at Westminster. MSPs felt that a "critical mass" of members was needed to fill committee seats and represent voters, making the possible reduction in seats a bad idea.

A small party that would gain seats under a national list allocation is the Scottish Socialist Party (SSP), which in 1999 won only a single seat (in Glasgow). The leader of the SSP, Tommy Sheridan, made news in 2001 when he was brought before the Scottish Parliament's standards committee by a constituency MSP who alleged that Sheridan improperly took up the case of a woman in her constituency, which lies outside his electoral region (Horsburgh 2001). The case raises interesting questions because Sheridan claims that the woman, a member of the SSP, asked for his intervention in the housing dispute with a local authority because her constituency MSP was not doing enough to

help her. In this instance, because the woman lived in the “wrong” place, she was unable to seek redress of her grievance from an MSP of her choice.

Electing list members on a nationwide basis would prevent this sort of problem from happening again, as well as help small parties like the SSP and the Greens win more seats because there would be more list seats to be allocated than under the current regional system (only seven are available per region). A national list system in Wales would help small parties overcome the bigger electoral bias there against them, where only four are elected per region, as well. Despite the potential for more seats and fewer troubles with constituency members, the SSP actually favours the retention of the regional list system. According to Sheridan’s press and policy officer, Hugh Kerr, while “the idea of a national list has some attraction for us (we would win more seats), we would be opposed to it as we value the links to the region, particularly Glasgow” (2001). He is also optimistic that the members of the standards committee will be “more flexible in their application” of the rules governing casework outside an MSP’s constituency or region (Kerr 2001). In fact, the *Guidance on the Relationships between MSPs* does say that dealing with a case or issue outside an MSP’s constituency or region is permitted “by prior arrangement” (Scotland 2000:93). However, Sheridan and his party would be relying upon the good graces of constituency MSPs who are sometimes hostile to list members who they believe should not act as “surrogate constituency MSPs,” while a national list system would simply eliminate the problem. Indeed, Sheridan’s attachment to a region could be seen as irrational in the way the constituency link outweighs electoral gain. The importance of the constituency link in the British political culture contrasts with that of Germany, where minor parties appear to be more interested in advancing the party’s interests, and a constituency presence is less important.

Conclusion

The electoral system does affect how British and German representatives view their roles in the political system. There is a statistically significant difference between the constituency and list members’ views about how accountable and representative they are, and this difference holds for both British and German legislators. On the other hand, on indicators of constituency and partisan orientation that measure behaviour, there were more significant differences between constituency and list representatives in Germany than in Scotland and Wales. Legislators in Scotland and Wales appear to be strongly constituency focused, whether they are elected in single-member constituencies or from party lists in larger electoral regions.

In Germany, many survey results confirm the hypothesised expectation that Landtag deputies elected in single-member constituencies will be closer to their constituents than party list members, but often only slight differences in response were found. Most of the differences between the two types of member are not statistically significant, although those that are reveal that list members are somewhat more oriented towards their parties than constituency members, while constituency members are more focused on constituents. In particular, constituency members are more eager to promote their constituencies and seek projects for them than their list counterparts, as previous Bundestag research has shown (Lancaster and Patterson 1990). Constituency members are also more successful in gaining public spending projects when they seek them, and

view this success, as well as helping constituents in general, as important to their re-election effort. Party list members seem more concerned than their constituency counterparts about the party's strength, getting manifesto pledges enacted, and maintaining the party leader's support. List members also appear more motivated to enter politics out of a desire to get their parties' policies enacted than constituency members, who are more motivated to serve constituents.

In Scotland and Wales, survey results show that the two types of representative do not do their jobs very differently. There does, however, appear to be more contact between constituency members and voters, and between list members and interest groups, as was hypothesised. Party list members also appear to be more concerned, when it comes to re-election, about the national strength of their party and having their leader's support. Otherwise, most differences between the activities and attitudes of the two types of members are not statistically significant. Both types of representative are highly partisan, and both are assuming active constituency roles. List members spend almost as much of their work time helping voters with their problems as constituency members do, and they also promote themselves heavily in their regions, making media appearances and attending meetings.

In the process of their self-promotion, however, list members in Scotland and Wales are stepping on the toes of constituency members, many of whom seem to resent what they consider to be an intrusion. Conflicts have arisen between constituency and list members in Scotland and Wales when list members shadow their constituency counterparts. In Germany, however, this kind of conflict is not the case. German constituency members accept the presence of list members in their constituencies far more readily than is the case in Britain, although many believe that they have closer ties to their constituency and serve constituents better than their list-elected counterparts. Comments from both constituency and list members indicate that there is a large degree of mutual respect, however, which is clearly lacking among many representatives in Scotland and to a lesser extent in Wales. If there is any overt "class division" between German legislators, it is that between the major and minor parties over constituency service, and has to do mainly with the number of deputies available to cover geographical constituencies (where SPD and CDU members have the advantage because of the size of their parliamentary parties).

If constituency members in Britain can learn to accept a constituency presence by their list colleagues, as is the practice in Germany, then the future of Britain's mixed-member electoral experiment looks promising. For the first time, voters in Scotland and Wales have a real choice when it comes to approaching an elected representative with a question or a problem. On the other hand, the high profile that many list members are creating for themselves is clearly frustrating to constituency members, most of whom are Labour members unaccustomed to having any competition at the local level. In order for the MMP system to be as successful in Scotland and Wales as it has been in Germany, Labour members, who now hold most constituency seats in both nations' assemblies, must learn to accept the increased competition brought about by their party's constitutional reform efforts. While the Labour members' problems with shadowing might simply disappear over time, it is possible that the more majoritarian political culture of Britain will prevent the kind of "tolerant" outcome seen in Germany. In a sense, Labour has become the victim of its own success; the party must come to terms

with the greater political pluralism in Scotland and Wales made possible by its constitutional reform project. Furthermore, Labour's electoral reform could be made more secure by learning from the very country whose transition from authoritarianism to democracy Britain assisted with the demand that a mechanism for building a closer relationship between constituents and their representatives be superimposed upon a system of proportional representation.

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Table 1 Contact with constituents

(A) Surgeries held/year		All members		Constituency		List		
Germany		20.7		21.3		20.3		
Scotland/Wales** ¹		45.6		57.3		35.1		
<i>Portion of work time spent:</i>	<i>0-5%</i>	<i>6-10%</i>	<i>11-15%</i>	<i>16-25%</i>	<i>26-50%</i>	<i>51-100%</i>	Wtd avege	No re-sponse
(B) Helping voters who have problems with government agencies								
Germany	31.5	32.6	16.9	10.1	6.7	0	10.4	2.2
•Constituency	20.0	37.5	22.5	7.5	7.5	0	11.4	5.0
•List	40.8	28.6	12.2	12.2	6.1	0	9.7	0
•SPD and CDU** ²	27.0	32.4	17.6	12.2	8.1	0	11.4	2.7
•PDS, Green, FDP, and DVU** ²	53.3	33.3	13.3	0	0	0	5.7	0
Scotland/Wales	15.3	19.4	27.8	19.4	4.2	6.9	16.3	6.9
•Constituency	9.1	12.1	30.3	21.2	9.1	6.1	17.5	12.1
•List	20.5	25.6	25.6	17.9	0	7.7	15.4	2.6
(C) Promoting your constituency/ <i>Land</i> /electoral region as a place to do business								
Germany	42.7	21.3	9.0	7.9	3.4	1.1	9.0	14.6
•Constituency** ¹	27.5	27.5	12.5	12.5	5.0	2.5	12.4	12.5
•List** ¹	55.1	16.3	6.1	4.1	2.0	0	6.1	16.3
Scotland/Wales	54.2	27.8	4.2	4.2	4.2	0	6.6	5.6
•Constituency	51.5	27.3	9.1	3.0	0	0	5.3	9.1
•List	56.4	28.2	0	5.1	7.7	0	7.6	2.6
(D) Seeking public spending projects for your constituency/ <i>Land</i> /electoral region								
Germany	49.4	23.6	10.1	3.4	3.4	0	7.2	10.1
•Constituency** ¹	25.0	42.5	10.0	7.5	5.0	0	9.7	10.0
•List** ¹	69.4	8.2	10.2	0	2.0	0	5.0	10.2
Scotland/Wales	44.4	33.3	6.9	8.3	0	0	6.4	6.9
•Constituency	39.4	36.4	12.1	3.0	0	0	6.1	9.1
•List	48.7	30.8	2.6	12.8	0	0	6.6	5.1

**¹Difference between constituency and list members is significant at the .01 level.

**²Difference between larger parties (SPD and CDU), taken together, and smaller parties (PDS, Greens, FDP, and DVU), taken together, is significant at the .01 level.

Table 2 Constituency versus party orientation: Task importance

Question: *How important is each of the following tasks of a Member of the Landtag/Parliament/Assembly?*

% response to each level of importance:	<i>Very</i>	<i>Some-what</i>	<i>No opinion</i>	<i>Not very</i>	<i>Not at all</i>	No re- sponse
<i>(A) Representing the collective views of your voters</i>						
Germany	48.3	49.4	0	1.1	0	1.1
•Constituency	42.5	52.5	0	2.5	0	2.5
•List	53.1	46.9	0	0	0	0
•SPD and CDU* ¹	43.2	54.1	0	1.4	0	1.4
•PDS, Green, FDP, and DVU* ¹	73.3	26.7	0	0	0	0
Scotland/Wales	77.8	15.3	2.8	0	0	4.2
•Constituency	81.8	12.1	3.0	0	0	3.0
•List	74.4	17.9	2.6	0	0	5.1
<i>(B) Enacting your party's election manifesto commitments into law</i>						
Germany	11.2	56.2	6.7	23.6	0	2.2
•Constituency* ²	7.5	47.5	7.5	32.5	0	5.0
•List* ²	14.3	63.3	6.1	16.3	0	0
•SPD and CDU* ¹	6.8	58.1	5.4	27.0	0	2.7
•PDS, Green, FDP, and DVU* ¹	33.3	46.7	13.3	6.7	0	0
Scotland/Wales	54.2	38.9	1.4	1.4	0	4.2
•Constituency	60.6	33.3	0	3.0	0	3.0
•List	48.7	43.6	2.6	0	0	5.1
<i>(C) Enhancing your party's strength</i>						
Germany	30.3	56.2	5.6	5.6	0	2.2
•Constituency* ²	20.0	57.5	7.5	10.0	0	5.0
•List* ²	38.8	55.1	4.1	2.0	0	0
Scotland/Wales	55.6	36.1	1.4	1.4	0	5.6
•Constituency	45.5	45.5	0	3.0	0	6.1
•List	64.1	28.2	2.6	0	0	5.1

*¹Difference between larger parties (SPD and CDU), taken together, and smaller parties (PDS, Greens, FDP, and DVU), taken together, is significant at the .05 level.

*²Difference between constituency and list members is significant at the .05 level.

Table 3 Constituency and partisan role conflict

Question: *If you had to choose only one or the other, which of the following was more instrumental in your decision to stand as a Member of the Landtag/Parliament/Assembly?*

- *Helping to get the policy preferences of your party enacted into law*
- *Serving the needs of your constituents/voters*

% responding from:	<i>Party policy</i>	<i>Voters</i>	(Both)	No response
Germany	44.9	40.4	10.1	4.5
•Constituency*	32.5	50.0	10.0	7.5
•List*	55.1	32.7	10.2	2.0
Scotland/Wales	34.7	55.6	6.9	2.8
•Constituency	33.3	54.5	6.1	6.1
•List	35.9	56.4	7.7	0

*Difference between constituency and list members is significant at the .05 level.

Table 4 Constituency and re-electionQuestion: *How important are the following to your re-election prospects?*

% response to each level of importance:	<i>Very</i>	<i>Some-what</i>	<i>No opinion</i>	<i>Not very</i>	<i>Not at all</i>	No response
(A) Your success in obtaining government-sponsored projects in your constituency/ <i>Land</i> /electoral region						
Germany	20.2	34.8	11.2	18.0	2.2	13.5
•Constituency** ¹	30.0	40.0	5.0	10.0	0	15.0
•List** ¹	12.2	30.6	16.3	24.5	4.1	12.2
•SPD and CDU** ²	21.6	39.2	8.1	12.2	2.7	16.2
•PDS, Green, FDP, and DVU** ²	13.3	13.3	26.7	46.7	0	0
Scotland/Wales	54.2	30.6	0	2.8	0	12.5
•Constituency* ³	63.6	21.2	0	0	0	15.2
•List* ³	46.2	38.5	0	5.1	0	10.3
(B) Helping people in your constituency/ <i>Land</i> /electoral region who have problems with government agencies						
Germany	36.0	37.1	3.4	14.6	0	8.9
•Constituency* ³	40.0	42.5	2.5	5.0	0	10.0
•List* ³	32.7	32.7	4.1	22.4	0	8.2
Scotland/Wales	54.2	30.6	0	2.8	0	12.5
•Constituency* ³	63.6	21.2	0	0	0	15.2
•List* ³	46.2	38.5	0	5.1	0	10.3

¹Difference between constituency and list members is significant at the .01 level.²Difference between larger parties (SPD and CDU), taken together, and smaller parties (PDS, Greens, FDP, and DVU), taken together, is significant at the .01 level.*³Difference between constituency and list members is significant at the .05 level.

Table 5A Attitudes towards the electoral system: Germany

Question: *How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about Members of the Landtag (MdLs)?*

Opinion:	<i>Strongly agree</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>No opinion</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Strongly disagree</i>	No response
<i>(A) MdLs elected from single-member constituencies are more accountable to voters than party list MdLs</i>						
All members	14.6	30.3	5.6	27.0	21.3	1.1
•Constituency** ¹	22.5	45.0	5.0	15.0	12.5	0
•List** ¹	8.2	18.4	6.1	36.7	28.6	2.0
<i>(B) Both types of MdL (party list and single-member constituency) are equally representative of the people of Brandenburg/Hesse</i>						
All members	46.1	33.7	6.7	11.2	0	2.2
•Constituency** ¹	22.5	40.0	12.5	22.5	0	2.5
•List** ¹	65.3	28.6	2.0	2.0	0	2.0
•SPD and CDU** ²	40.5	35.1	8.1	13.5	0	2.7
•PDS, Green, FDP, and DVU** ²	73.3	26.7	0	0	0	0

^{**1}Difference between constituency and list members is significant at the .01 level.

^{**2}Difference between larger parties (SPD and CDU), taken together, and smaller parties (PDS, Greens, FDP, and DVU), taken together, is significant at the .01 level.

Table 5B Attitudes towards the electoral system: Scotland and Wales

Question: *How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about Members of the Scottish Parliament/National Assembly for Wales (MSPs/AMs)?*

Opinion:	<i>Strongly agree</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>No opinion</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Strongly disagree</i>	No response
<i>(A) MSPs/AMs elected from single-member constituencies are more accountable to voters than party list MSPs/AMs</i>						
All members	25.0	31.9	16.7	19.4	6.9	0
•Constituency**	42.4	48.5	3.0	6.1	0	0
•List**	10.3	17.9	28.2	30.8	12.8	0
<i>(B) Both types of MSPs/AMs (party list and single-member constituency) are equally representative of the people of Scotland/Wales</i>						
All members	45.8	37.5	2.8	8.3	5.6	0
•Constituency**	18.2	51.5	6.1	15.2	9.1	0
•List**	69.2	25.6	0	2.6	2.6	0

^{**}Difference between constituency and list members is significant at the .01 level.

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