Peter Mair

and the Europeanization

of parties and party systems

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- to facilitate its members' engagement in high-quality academic research, individually, collectively in the Unit and in collaboration with cognate research groups and individuals in the UK and abroad;
- to hold regular conferences, workshops, seminars and guest lectures on topics related to European political parties;
- to publish a series of parties-related research papers by scholars from Keele and elsewhere;
- to expand postgraduate training in the study of political parties, principally through Keele's MA in Parties and Elections and the multinational PhD summer school, with which its members are closely involved;
- to constitute a source of expertise on European parties and party politics for media and other interests.

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Peter Mair and the Europeanization of parties and party systems

INTRODUCTION

I am delighted and honoured to have been asked to participate in this ECPR Round Table in memory of Peter Mair. Our focus today is Peter’s academic work, but before turning to that, I would like to note that Peter was of course much more than an academic. He was a loyal and supportive friend to countless colleagues and someone with whom it was always a pleasure to share a coffee, or even the odd pint. Always generous with his time and open to new ideas, Peter was an exceptionally stimulating person to be around. He did much to foster the development of in particular career-young students of party politics, not least through his editorship of *West European Politics*, but also via his support for the ECRP Standing Group on Political Parties, which I have convened since 2003 and to whose annual PhD summer school he was a regular and much-valued contributor. It was a privilege to have known him and he will be sorely missed.

Peter was without doubt a world-class scholar of party politics and he made a major contribution to our understanding of political parties and party systems. I have been asked to focus my initial contribution to today’s Round Table on Peter’s contribution to the literature on the Europeanization of parties and party systems. I shall commence these necessarily brief remarks by highlighting some of the main themes of Peter’s prior work on European parties and party systems. Thereafter, I will speak briefly about his concept of Europeanization, before moving to the main section, in which I will identify key themes from Peter’s contribution to that literature. Finally, I will make some remarks intended to stimulate discussion. In a nutshell, I will be arguing first, that Peter’s contribution to the literature on the Europeanization of parties and party systems can best be understood as an extension and

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1 This Working Paper constitutes the author’s contribution to the Roundtable in Memory of Peter Mair, Joint Sessions of the European Consortium for Political Research, University of Antwerp, 12 April 2012.
deepening of themes on which he had already made significant contributions. Second, Peter undeniably generated original and important insights on the Europeanization of party politics, but his work on European parties and party systems is not limited to Europeanization and is indeed of much wider significance. Third, one might thus question whether the Europeanization paradigm is necessary or sufficient to evaluate Peter’s enormous contribution to our understanding of parties and party systems in contemporary European democracy. Finally, though Peter’s later writings on the Europeanization of political parties and party systems understandably exhibit considerable concern about the unprecedented challenges facing contemporary democracy, I think it is inappropriate to characterise him as having become a pessimist.

**FOUR THEMES FROM PETER’S PRIOR WORK.**

I would like to highlight four interrelated topics on which Peter worked prior to entering the field of Europeanization of parties and party systems and which I think shaped what he went on to write on the latter field. The first concerns the causes of party system change. I was fortunate to be a participant in a very stimulating workshop Peter co-directed on this topic with Gordon Smith at the ECPR Joint Sessions in Rimini in April 1988. A major theme was that party system change was a function not only of exogenous change in respect of matters such as cleavage structures and electoral behaviour, but was also significantly shaped by endogenous factors. In particular, the workshop placed considerable emphasis on the extent to which the continuing centrality of political parties to what Smith referred to as the ‘core’ of their respective party systems was related to the strategies they chose to adopt. This implies that the challenges which political parties face are at least in part of their own making. Possibly more reassuringly for the parties, however, it also implies they have the potential to at least mitigate the negative impact of exogenous change on the pattern of party competition. In other words, political parties are not helpless objects of change, but can act to shape their future. Although the workshop and ensuing publication (Mair and Smith 1989) did not use the term, it was in essence arguing for the inclusion of an agency perspective in the study of party systems change.

Most workshop participants were quite optimistic about the capacity of mainstream political parties to identify and implement adaptive responses that would enable a considerable degree of continuity in west European party systems. European integration barely figured on our
radar. Moreover, there was no real sense that we were observing a fundamental challenge to the established system of party democracy. Yet by 2011, Peter had made a significant contribution to the emerging theme of the Europeanization of parties and party systems and although he was still interested in agency, he had become critical about the strategies and behaviour of political parties and critical about the capacity of political parties to offer meaningful choice in contemporary European democracy.

A second major focus of Peter’s prior work was party organization. As we all know, in the early 1990s, he co-directed with Dick Katz a major project that massively increased our empirical knowledge of how political parties are organised (Katz and Mair 1992, 1994) and went on to posit the emergence of what they termed the ‘cartel party’ (Katz and Mair 1995). In a nutshell, they argued that the latter had adapted to the loosening of its ties with society – as evidenced, for example, by declining membership and rising voter volatility – by gravitating to the state, on the resources of which they increasingly came to rely, as well as by engaging with other such parties in collusive behaviour designed to maintain their predominance in the system of party competition.

Third, Peter shaped the literature on the classification of party systems, not least through a seminal essay on the structure of party system competition, first published in 1996. (Mair 1996, 1997). For Peter, party systems were above all about competition for office and in that essay he thus stressed the importance of distinguishing between party systems by reference to the extent to which the structure of competition for governmental office was open, or closed. That was, he argued, determined by three factors: whether the pattern of alternation in government was wholesale or partial; whether governing formulas were ‘familiar’ or ‘innovative’ and the extent to which access to governing office was restricted to a few parties, or open to many.

Fourth, Peter became interested in populism and in January 2000 we were both at another interesting workshop, this time hosted at the Robert Schuman Centre by Yves Meny. It focused on populism and democracy. A major theme of the workshop and ensuing publication (Meny and Surel 2002) was the extent to which it might be useful to regard populist parties less as inherently pathological for democracy, and instead more as symptomatic of a growing gap between popular democracy linked to the legitimating demos and the elite-driven institutional dimension of modern representative democracy.
In sum, well before he started publishing on the Europeanization of parties and party systems, Peter had developed an actor-centric approach to party system change; had offered new perspectives on the classification of party systems; had diagnosed a loosening of parties’ ties to society and the migration of mainstream parties to the state; had written about the collusive practices by which these parties sought to privilege themselves in the party system – which for him was above all about the competitive struggle for office – and had started to become interested in the manner in which that collusion was mirrored by the rise of populist parties.

**PETER’S CONCEPTUALISATION OF EUROPEANIZATION**

An early attempt at developing a systematic framework for analysing the Europeanization of political parties was published by my Keele colleague, Robert Ladrech, who in 2002 identified five dimensions worthy of investigating: programmatic change; organisational change; patterns of party competition; party-government relations and relations beyond the national political system.² Although there remains much debate over the definition of the concept and its utility, the literature has tended to distinguish between two senses of party and party system Europeanization. One relates to the supranational role which parties play in the development of EU-level political authority. The other comprises the impact of European integration on parties and party systems at the national level. This latter aspect was defined by Ladrech as ‘an incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making’ (1994: 69). Writing in 2007, Peter argued that these two senses of Europeanization can be considered the limits of a single Europeanization dimension bounded at one end by conflict regarding the *institutionalisation* of a distinct European political space, and at the other by conflicts regard the impact of *penetration* of European rules, directives and norms into the domestic sphere (2007: 156). He referred to these as *mechanisms* of Europeanization. Like other contributors to the field, he proposed that one could usefully focus on the *direct* and *indirect* impact of each. This generated what he characterised as four ‘core research questions’ (Mair 2007: 156-161).

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² Ladrech (2002). For a more recent succinct review of the literature on the Europeanization, see Ladrech (2009: 9-10).
KEY THEMES FROM PETER’S WORK ON THE EUROPEANIZATION OF PARTY POLITICS

Peter’s work on the Europeanization of party politics touched on all four of these research questions, but focused in particular on the indirect impact and on penetration, i.e. those on which least research had been undertaken. In his first major publication on Europeanization (Mair 2000), Peter was careful to limit his focus to evaluating the evidence for a direct impact of European rules, directives and norms on the format and mechanics of national party systems. He famously concluded that the impact had as yet been very limited. In terms of party system format, new parties had emerged, but very few were linked directly to Europe and they were in any event electorally markedly unsuccessful. In respect of mechanics, he found contestation of Europe, but by parties that had relatively small shares of the vote and were located at the left and right extremes. Moreover, although they were anti-European, they ‘were not primarily dependent on an anti-European appeal’ (2000: 34). Peter also argued that that competition in the European electoral arena and from transnational party alignments had not spilled over to the national party systems. For one, the national parties remained the principal gatekeepers for the supranational arena. Second, while there were groupings in the European Parliament, they could not compete for executive office.

Yet this article also contained at least four themes Peter subsequently developed further.
1. In the absence of competition for EU executive office, the supranational arena had an incomplete party system (see also Mair 2005b; 2007a; 2007b; 2011).
2. European integration constrains national governments’ freedom for manoeuvre and thus hollows out competition amongst parties who aspire to hold national office. He later elaborated on this by specifying that it limited the policy space available to competing parties, reduced the policy instruments at the disposal of national governments and limited the policy repertoire (2007b: 159-160; 2006).

3 There was already a considerable literature on parties and institutionalisation and it has continued to grow apace and become increasingly sophisticated. Its focus has been above all threefold: the development of transnational party federations; the interaction within the European Parliament of party groups and fractions (e.g. Pridham, Bardi, Hix etc.) and on elections to the European Parliament (e.g. Thomassen; Schmitt). See the useful review by Ladrech (2009). I am not going to say much about this aspect. For one, I assume that Lisbet Hooghe is likely to address it in her contribution to this Round Table. Second, whilst Peter did contribute to that literature – amongst other things in an interesting article co-authored Jacques Thomassen (Mair and Thomassen 2010), most of his work focused on the impact of the European Union on national parties and party systems.
3. Party competition at the national and supranational levels is characterised by a ‘misplacement’ of issues. Whilst those relating to the future constitution of Europe are largely kept out of national competition and limited to competition the European Parliament elections, where the competence does not lie, day-to-day policy issues dominate national electoral competition, even if those policy areas are largely decided at the European Union level. (See also e.g. Mair 2007b: 7-12)

4. As a result, Europe is depoliticised at the national level and is reduced to an elite and bureaucratic activity in which citizens are as a rule not engaged or consulted. He claimed this was the strongest evidence of the indirect impact of European integration of national party systems. He returned to this theme in numerous subsequent publications, in one of which he asserted that de-politicisation and disengagement risks ‘an indirect effect whereby all elections, and not just European elections, are turned into second-order – or at least second-rate – contests’ (Mair 2007b: 161).

Both in his initial *West European Politics* article (2000: 48) and later, Peter stressed that European integration was reinforcing an *existing national-level trend* for depoliticization and thus for popular indifference and disengagement. This is very evident in a 2005 paper he presented in Irvine, for example. It provides a detailed illustration of what he terms ‘popular withdrawal’ and ‘withdrawal of elites’ and argues against viewing this in terms of a causal sequence, but rather as a mutually reinforcing process (Mair 2005a: 21). It is, Peter maintains, leading to a growing gap between citizens and their political leaders, who are increasingly retreating into what he terms the ‘closed world of the governing institutions’ (2005a: 17). In turn, this helps fuel populist mobilization and – as the paper’s title suggests – might be threatening a move to ‘Democracy beyond parties’, or what he was in 2009 to describe as ‘a malaise that now suffuses democracy’ (Mair 2009: 17). It is striking that the EU does not figure at all in the empirical part of the Irvine paper, but only in its concluding section. Here, Peter argues that the growing gap between citizens and their political leaders has ‘helped fuel demands for more non-majoritarian’ decision-making, and for a greater role to be accorded to various non-partisan and non-political agencies -- … most grandly to the EU itself” (Mair 2005a: 21).

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4 See also, for example, Mair 2005b and 2007a.
5 It is also worth noting that Peter appears here to be arguing that this aspect of Europeanization as institutionalisation is a consequence of party and party system developments at the national level.
A further example of Peter’s emphasis on the extent to which depoliticisation linked to Europeanization reinforces a prior national trend is to be found in his 2005 EUROGOV paper on *Popular Democracy and the European Union Polity*. Here, he writes the following:

> efforts to displace conflict dimensions into arenas where democratic authority is lacking, as well as the efforts to depoliticise issues that relate to European integration [in] the EU should not be seen as exceptional … but… as symptomatic of a wider process of de-politicisation (Mair 2005b: 3).

The EUROGOV paper devotes considerable attention to another of the major themes of Peter’s work on the Europeanization of party politics, namely, the role of party strategy in shaping (or possibly misshaping) party competition. As I mentioned earlier, Peter’s prior work had discussed the importance of parties’ strategic choices for national party systems. He now extended that actor-centric approach to explaining the Europeanization of party politics. For example, he repeatedly argues that that the ‘misplacement’ of issues may at least in part be explained by party leaderships deliberately seeking to avoid contestation of issues that they want to depoliticise (2000: 47), not least because by doing so they ‘freed themselves from any possible restraints imposed by external and binding mandates (2005b: 10). Similarly, he argues that ‘we might conclude that Europe fails to impact on national party systems because it is held at one remove by the competing political leaderships, such that, in terms of domestic politics at least, it is often depoliticised’ (2000: 48; see also Mair 2007b).

Peter takes this agency perspective further, by suggesting that one plausible reason for the absence of ‘popular democracy’ at the EU-level is that the ‘EU construct’ (Mair: 2005b: 17-24) ‘is the house that party politicians built’. National political leaders, he says ‘were motivated more by self-interest than by a sense of common good’. They ‘did not want to see the emergence of institutional competitors’. Moreover, ‘through Europe, as through the use of other non-majoritarian institutions, politicians can … gradually divest themselves of responsibility for potentially unpopular policy decisions and so cushion themselves against possible voter discontent’ (Mair 2005b: 20). Indeed, he goes on to argue that ‘the European Union was established and extended in order to provide a political system that could go beyond conventional democratic legitimacy. … one result of the downgrading of normal democratic processes … has been an emerging popular discontent and scepticism’ (Mair 2005b: 23)⁶

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⁶ Similar arguments are articulated elsewhere (e.g. Mair 2007b: 163).
This brings us to a further theme of Peter’s work on the Europeanization of party politics, and one that again reflects his broader concern with national-level systems. This relates to how European integration has contributed to promoting populist mobilization. One of the main drivers of Eurosceptic populism Peter identifies is depoliticisation. Another is the absence of an opportunity to express classical opposition, which he argues makes an opposition of principle more likely (e.g. Mair 2007a). Also important is Peter’s proposition that we are witnessing the development of increasingly distinct roles for mainstream parties on the one hand, and populist parties on the other. He maintains that the former are increasingly unable to represent. Moreover, although they hold office, they are ever more constrained by non-majoritarian institutions at the EU level. For their part, populist parties are much more expressive and engage in irresponsible outbidding, not least because they usually have no realistic prospect of incumbency (e.g. Mair 2009).

More recently still, Peter supplemented his emphasis on the gap between the citizenry and the governing parties with a consideration of the output dimension and capacity constraints. In part, this reflected a long-term development linked inter alia with the end of ‘permissive liberalism’, a trend exacerbated by the Maastricht Treaty and Stability Pact, but neither unique to, nor originating at the EU level. Peter’s interest in this aspect was heightened by the financial and subsequent Euro zone sovereign debt crisis. In a Robert Schuman Centre paper he published last year (Mair 2011a), and using the Irish case as an example, Peter suggested that the national level no longer had adequate resources to deal with the financial crisis. At a related presentation he gave at the CEU in May 2011, where he again used the language of Eastonian systems theory, Peter suggested that the only way to overcome the gap between input demands and deficient performance might be for the EU to move from its hitherto primarily regulatory role to embrace a resource extraction and allocation role. He went on to say he was ‘increasingly coming to believe … that the only way to square the circle [is to] move democracy up from the national level … where there are resources that matter and where these can be brought under political control’ (Mair: 2011b). I am unsure how seriously he meant this, and even if he did, we will unfortunately now never know whether he would have remained wedded to that idea. For one, as he himself acknowledged, moving democracy up from the national to the supranational level could at least in the medium term severely exacerbate the legitimacy problems that were at the core of his critique of contemporary
European democracy. Moreover, a co-authored article he published a year earlier (Mair and Thomassen 2010) suggests he was against introducing party government at the EU level.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

To summarise, Peter generated very wide-ranging, rich, original and nuanced work on the Europeanization of parties and party systems. I have tried to show that this can perhaps best be understood as developing major themes of party politics on which he had written before he turned to Europeanization. To recall, that earlier work included an actor-centric approach to party system change; a novel classification of party systems; a major project on party organization; an analysis of the loosening of parties’ ties to society and the migration of mainstream parties to the state; highlighting of the collusive practices by which these parties sought to privilege themselves in the party system – which for him was above all about the competitive struggle for office – and reflections on the manner in which that collusion was mirrored by the rise of populist parties.

Though I was asked to speak about Peter’s contribution to the literature on the Europeanization of party politics, his work is of course considerably broader in its range and in its significance. One might thus question whether the Europeanization paradigm is necessary, or sufficient to evaluate his contribution to our understanding of parties and party systems in contemporary European democracy. There are also other reasons to question the value of the Europeanization framework. Prominent amongst these is the increasingly interrelated nature of European and national decision-making and of party activity in these two fields, a point Peter himself raised (2007b: 164). At times, European integration is examined by Peter as an independent variable. One example is his original West European Politics article (Mair 2000). Another is his argument that disengagement from and disinterest in EU-level politics and the European Parliament elections had the potential to make all elections second-order (Mair 2007b: 161). Yet elsewhere, it could be seen as a dependent variable. An example is his above mentioned proposition that the EU-level absence of popular democracy and existence of non-majoritarian institutions may well have resulted from a strategic calculations on the part of national political leaders (Mair: 2005b: 17-24). The increasingly interrelated nature of European and national decision-making and of party activity in at these two levels means amongst other things, that it is becoming increasingly
difficult to pin down the flow of causality, not least in work as ambitious and wide-ranging as that which Peter produced and which we are honouring today.

When preparing for this Round Table, I re-read a significant proportion of what Peter wrote since the late 1980s on political parties and party systems. In doing so, I was struck – as others have been – by the much more critical tone he had come to adopt, not least on the party-systemic impact of party strategies. Given the significant ways in which European party politics has changed in the course of the decades during which Peter wrote and in particular the global financial and Euro sovereign debt crises of recent years, that more critical tone is unsurprising. In his more recent work, Peter argues that whilst party strategies and behaviour might at the time appear rational to the parties themselves, it is ultimately dysfunctional and undermines politics as a whole. Indeed, in 2005 he describes an interpretation he had reached only two years earlier as ‘far too sanguine’ (Mair 2005b: 22) and appears to be arguing that these strategies have contributed to seriously compromising the capacity of political parties to offer meaningful choice in contemporary European democracy. In sum, Peter had become increasingly concerned about the contemporary ‘malaise’ (Mair 2009: 17) of European party democracy, which he saw as the product *inter alia* of societal change, of the establishment of supranational European institutions and of globalised markets.

A lot of what was unfortunately to constitute Peter’s last writings on European parties and party systems is indeed infused by a considerable degree of scepticism. Yet one should be wary of concluding that he had – as some people have argued – become incurably pessimistic about the future of party democracy. His abrupt and premature departure means we will unfortunately never know how enduring that scepticism would have been. When reading what he wrote in recent years, I am struck less by a sense of pessimism than by a spirit of earnest enquiry as to possible solutions to the current malaise of European party democracy. Moreover, I reminded of the theme of the 1988 Rimini Joint Sessions conference at which I first met Peter, namely, that whilst the challenges political parties face might be at least in part of their own making, parties’ capacity for making strategic choices holds out the possibility that they can at least mitigate the negative impact of exogenous change. Accordingly, they retain the potential to shape both their future and the future of party democracy. I am thus tempted to conclude that although Peter’s writings certainly exhibited a healthy scepticism, any pessimism that might have crept into them would not have endured. Peter had a profound knowledge of the often turbulent history of European political parties.
and had always emphasised their adaptive capacity. In my judgement, he had become increasingly critical of party democracy, but contrary to those who have long predicted the demise or irrelevance of political parties, he probably still felt they were indispensable and would contribute to finding solutions to the undeniable challenges currently facing European democracy.

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